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The five essays gathered in this collection were written between 2011 and 2014 
and circulated until now only as individual working papers. A much abbreviated 
and altered blend of chapters 2 and 3 appeared as Blommaert & Varis (2015); 
chapter 5 will be published in 2015 as part of a special issue (edited by both 
authors) on “the importance of unimportant language” in Multilingual Margins. 
The papers are presented here in chronological order and thus represent a joint 
quest for more accurate and realistic forms of analysis of what is commonly 
called identity – in turn something embedded in notions such as culture, group, 
community or society. This quest was prompted by frequent encounters in our 
research on online and offline aspects of superdiversity with forms of behavioral 
patterning suggesting a growing preference for “small” identities – identities 
grounded in patterned and carefully dosed details of behavior – and “light” 
groups – groups not tied together by the vast amount of backgrounds, shared 
space and cultural assumptions imagined since Durkheim as the real stuff of 
social life and structure. These encounters compelled us to devise a small 
descriptive vocabulary – “enoughness”, “microhegemonies”, (chapter 1), 
identities as “accent”, (chapter 2), “life projects” and “light communities” 
(chapter 4) – capable of capturing these phenomena and doing justice to their 
importance as identity processes worthy of independent examination, but seen 
as operating in conjunction with – as a set of layers on top of, so to speak –better 
known “big” identities. 
The individual working papers drew the attention of several scholars, and part of 
the vocabulary we designed is currently circulating in new scholarly work – 
which is gratifying. By bringing the separate papers together, however, we hope 
to achieve slightly more, showing our readers the coherence and gradual 
construction of a theoretical and analytical approach capable of accurately 
identifying and examining contemporary forms of identity processes, their 
complexities and impact. Our ongoing research, we hope, will soon add 
substance and detail to some of the more speculative statements presented here. 
Tilburg, June 2015 
Jan Blommaert & Piia Varis 
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Chapter 1: 




This short paper intends to sketch an empirical theory of identity in a context of 
superdiversity.1 It adds to the development of new approaches to language and 
semiotics in superdiverse environments (Blommaert & Rampton 2011), and 
intends to offer a realistic, yet generalizable, approach to inquiries into the 
complexities of contemporary identity practices. Such practices now evolve in 
real-life as well as in virtual contexts, and connections between both social 
universes are of major importance for our understanding of what superdiverse 
society is about. 
These complexities are baffling, yet perhaps not entirely new; what is new is the 
awareness of such complexities among academic and lay observers. Late 
Modernity – the stage of Modernity in which the emergence of superdiversity is 
to be situated – has been described as an era of hybridized, fragmented and 
polymorph identities (e.g. Deleuze & Guattari 2001; Zizek 1994), often also 
subject to conscious practices of ‘styling’ (Rampton 1995; Bucholtz & Trechter 
2001; Coupland 2007). Prima facie evidence appears to confirm this: people do 
orient towards entirely different logics in different segments of life – one’s 
political views may not entirely correspond to stances taken in domains such as 
consumption, education or property.  So here is a first point to be made about 
contemporary identities: they are organized as a patchwork of different specific 
objects and directions of action. 
 
Micro-hegemonies 
It is perfectly acceptable these days to, for instance, have strong and outspoken 
preferences for a Green party and participate actively in electoral campaigns 
underscoring the importance of environmental issues and the value of 
sociocultural diversity, while also driving a diesel car and sending one’s children 
to a school with low numbers of immigrant learners. The robust hegemonies that 
appeared to characterize Modernity have been traded for a blending within one 
individual life-project of several micro-hegemonies valid in specific segments of 
life and behavior, and providing the ‘most logical’ solution (or the ‘truth’) within 
these segments. Thus, our Green party supporter can ‘logically’ drive a diesel car 
when s/he has a job that involves frequent and long journeys by car, since diesel 
                                                        
1 This paper emerged in the context of the HERA project “Investigating discourses of inheritance and 
identity in four multilingual European settings”, and was first discussed during a meeting in 
Birmingham, May 2011. We are grateful to the participants of that meeting, and in particular to 
Adrian Blackledge, Angela Creese, Jens-Normann Jörgensen, Marilyn Martin-Jones and Ben 
Rampton for stimulating reflections on that occasion.  
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fuel is cheaper than other fuel types, and diesel cars have a reputation for lasting 
longer and being more robust than others. Our Green party supporter, then, finds 
him-/herself in the company of an entirely different community when issues of 
mobility and car use emerge than when general environmental politics are on 
the agenda; yet in both instances a particular micro-hegemony has been 
followed. The same occurs in the case of education: our Green party supporter 
wants ‘the best for his children’, and since highly ‘mixed’ schools are reputed to 
produce low quality standards in educational outputs, our subject again follows 
the most logical path in that field. For each of these topics, our subject can shift 
‘footing’, to use a Goffmanian term, and each time s/he will deploy an entirely 
different register, genre, viewpoint and speaking position (cf. Agha 2007).  
An individual life-project so becomes a dynamic (i.e. perpetually adjustable) 
complex of micro-hegemonies within which subjects situate their practices and 
behavior. Such complexes – we can call them a ‘repertoire’ – are not chaotic, and 
people often are not at all ‘confused’ or ‘ambivalent’ about their choices, nor 
appear to be ‘caught between’ different cultures or ‘contradict themselves’ when 
speaking about different topics. The complex of micro-hegemonies just provides 
a different type of order, a complex order composed of different niches of 
ordered behavior and discourses about behavior.  
The combination of such micro-hegemonized niches is ultimately what would 
make up ‘the’ identity of someone. But already it is clear that identity as a 
singular notion has outlasted its usefulness – people define their ‘identity’ 
(singular) in relation to a multitude of different niches – social ‘spheres’ in 
Bakhtin’s famous terms – and this is a plural term. One can be perfectly oneself 
while articulating sharply different orientations in different domains of life or on 
different issues. A left-wing person can thus perfectly, and unproblematically, 
enjoy the beauty of the works of Céline and d’Annunzio, notoriously fascist 
authors, since the criteria for literary beauty need not be identitical to those that 
apply to voting behavior. 
 
Discursive orientations and the quest for authenticity 
The foregoing argument is surely unsurprising; it can be empirically 
corroborated in a wide variety of ways and it undoubtedly reflects the life 
experiences of many of us. But we need to go further. What follows is a schematic 
general framework for investigating the complex and dynamic identity processes 
we outlined above. We can identify four points in this framework. 
a. Identity discourses and practices can be described as discursive 
orientations towards sets of features that are seen (or can be seen) as 
emblematic of particular identities. These features can be manifold and 
include artefacts, styles, forms of language, places, times, forms of art or 
aesthetics, ideas and so forth. 
b. To be more precise, we will invariably encounter specific arrangements 
or configurations of such potentially emblematic features. The features 
rarely occur as a random or flexible complex; when they appear they are 
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presented (and oriented towards) as ‘essential’ combinations of features 
that reflect, bestow and emphasize ‘authenticity’. 
c. We will inevitably encounter different degrees of fluency in 
enregistering these discursive orientations. Consequently, identity 
practices will very often include stratified distinctions between ‘experts’ 
and ‘novices’, ‘teachers’ and ‘learners’, and ‘degrees’ of authenticity. In 
this respect, we will see an implicit benchmark being applied: 
‘enoughness’. One has to ‘have’ enough of the emblematic features in 
order to be ratified as an authentic member of an identity category. 
d. Obviously, these processes involve conflict and contestation, especially 
revolving around ‘enoughness’ (s/he is not enough of X; or too much of X) 
as well as about the particular configurations of emblematic features (‘in 
order to be X, you need to have 1,2,3,4 and 5’ versus ‘you can’t be X 
without having 6, 7, 8, 9’). And given this essentially contested character, 
these processes are highly dynamic: configurations of features and 
criteria of enoughness can be adjusted, reinvented, amended. 
Let us clarify some of the points. 
1. We speak of identity practices as discursive orientations towards sets of 
emblematic resources. The reason is that, empirically, when talking about 
identity or acting within an identity category, people ‘point towards’ a wide 
variety of objects that characterize their identities. Particular identities are 
clarified – i.e. offered for inspection to others – by referring to particular forms of 
music (e.g. classical music versus heavy metal), dress codes (the suit-and-
necktie, Gothic style, dreadlocks, blingbling), food preferences or habits (e.g. 
vegetarians versus steak-eaters, oriental or Mediterranean cuisine, beer versus 
wine drinkers), forms of language (e.g. RP versus Estuarian British English; 
HipHop or Rasta jargon, specialized professional jargons, hobby jargons such as 
the discourse of wine experts, foreign accents etc.), art forms (e.g. Manga, 
contemporary or conceptual art; ‘pulp’ versus ‘high’ movies etc.), names (being 
able to name all the football players in a favorite team; being able to refer to 
Hegel, Marx, Tarkowski, Dylan Thomas, practices of ‘name dropping’) and so on. 
Discourses in which people identify themselves and others include a bewildering 
range of objects towards which such people express affinity, attachment, 
belonging; or rejection, disgust, disapproval.  One can read Bourdieu’s Distinction 
(1984) as an illustration of the range of features that can be invoked as 
emblematic of particular (class) identities. 
2. These features, however, need to be taken seriously because they are never 
organized at random: they appear in specific arrangements and configurations. It 
is at this point and by means of such particular arrangements that one can, for 
instance, distinguish discourses of identity-as-heritage as discourses in which 
the particular configuration of features reflects and emanates images of 
unbroken, trans-generational transmission of ‘traditions’, of timeless essentials, 
of reproduction of that which is already there. Discourses of identity-as-creation 
would, contrarily, be organized around configurations that enable an imagery of 
innovation, discontinuity and deviation. Thus, it is clear that administrative 
criteria for, e.g., Britishness include very different configurations of discourses 
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on the same issue from a right-wing nationalist organization, a cultural heritage 
foundation or a radio DJ specializing in Reggae. ‘Essential’ Britishness will each 
time appear in an entirely different shape. One can already anticipate the many 
ways in which such differences can become fields of sharp conflict and 
contestation, and we will return to this below. 
3. The different degrees of fluency in enregistering these discursive orientations 
are crucial as another field of contest and conflict. When criteria are being set 
(i.e. particular configurations of emblematic features are assembled), some 
people will inevitably have easier access to these features than others, and will 
consequently have less problems in discoursing about them (and ‘in’ them, by 
embodying them or by displaying them as part of their ‘habitus’). We emphasize 
the processual and dynamic nature of this: we use ‘enregistering’ rather than 
‘register’, because as we have seen, the specific configuration of features is 
always changeable and never stable, and people are confronted with the task of 
perpetual re-enregistering rather than just acquiring and learning, once and for 
all, the register. Competence (to use an old term) is competence in changing the 
parameters of identity categories, and in adjusting to such changes. 
4. Conflict and contest are evident in such a shifting and dynamic process, where, 
furthermore, the stakes are sometimes quite high. Being qualified by others as a 
‘wannabe’, a ‘fake’ or some other dismissive category is one of many people’s 
greatest anxieties. For people charged with crimes, or asylum seekers hoping to 
acquire the refugee status, such categorizations can be a matter of life and death. 
5. A special note about ‘enoughness’ is in order. The benchmark for being 
admitted into an identity category (as a ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ member) is ‘having 
enough’ of the features specified for them. This is slippery terrain, because 
‘enough’ is manifestly a judgment, often a compromise, and rarely a black-and-
white and well-defined set of criteria (this even counts for apparently clear and 
unambiguous administrative criteria, see Mehan 1996 for an excellent example 
of a ‘learning disabled’ child; Blommaert 2009 for a judgment call of sorts in 
asylum procedures). Competence, to return to what we said above, often 
revolves around the capacity to make adequate judgment calls on enoughness. 
Enoughness also explains some of the strange and apparently incoherent 
phenomena observed in contexts where authenticity is the core of the issue, as in 
minority cultural groups. We observe in such contexts that the use and display of 
‘homeopathic’ doses of e.g. the heritage language can suffice as acts of authentic 
identity. Greetings and other concise communicative rituals, indigenous songs or 
dances can prevail over the absence of most of ‘indigenous’ culture as features 
that produce enough authenticity (e.g. Moore 2011 for an excellent example; also 
Silverstein 2006). In contexts of rapid sociocultural change (as e.g. in the case of 
migration) and the dispersal of contexts for identity work (as in the increased 
use of social media), we can expect enoughness to gain more and more 
importance as a critical tool for identity work. One needs to be ‘enough’ of a 
rapper, not ‘too much’; the same goes for an art lover, an intellectual, a football 




Enoughness in action 1: The chav 
The range of features that can be employed in identity work in order to produce 
authenticity can be wide and include a number of different, and sometimes very 
elaborate semiotic means. However, in actual practice the features that produce 
recognisable identities can be reduced to a very limited set, and here we 
encounter something that can be called ‘dosing’. That is, mobilising an authentic 
identity discourse about oneself can be a matter of attending to the most 
infinitesimally small details – sometimes even only observable to those ‘in the 
know’ – and a very small number of recognisable items, such as a piece of 
clothing. 2 
In enregistering such features, certain rules need to be observed for the process 
to be successful – to be recognised by others as what was intended. These are the 
rules that ‘newcomers’, ‘beginners’ and ‘wannabes’ need to observe and mobilise 
in their own identity work in order to ‘pass’ as authentic to someone (cf. e.g. 
Kennedy’s 2001 account on racial passing). This is where the Internet, for all the 
freedom and opportunity it is seen as offering for creative identity-play, appears 
not only as a useful instructional, normative source for the ‘wannabe’ but also as 
a space rife with regulatory discourses on ‘how to’ be or become someone. 
YouTube, for instance, features plenty of ‘how to’ videos – videos providing 
viewers with instructions on the minute details of how to be an ‘authentic’ 
gangsta or emo – that is, the features that should be employed for an authentic 
identity as a gangsta or an emo to be produced. The Internet now offers an 
infinite range of identity assembly kits and complements them with volumes of 
users’ guides. Such identities are not necessarily offered to replace others; they 
are offered as additional niches, and one can walk in and out of them ad lib. The 
users’ guides, therefore, are the micro-hegemonies we mentioned above.  
The chav culture – a form of working-class British youth culture – is one example 
of a subculture very visible on the Internet. A search online for anything ‘chav’ 
provides plenty of material for someone wishing to ‘chavify’ oneself (although it 
should be perhaps pointed out that this is not amongst the most desired and 
aspired to identities to be displayed by young Brits) – from YouTube videos to 
images that put forvard a ‘chav-semiotics’ where certain features are iconic of a 
chav identity.  
                                                        
2 We can see ‘dosing’ also in the many studies of ‘styling’ now available in the literature since 
Rampton’s (1995) pioneering work. Homeopathic doses of features – one sound sometimes, or 




         Figure 1: The chav 
Chav identity, as articulated for instance on YouTube, is flagged by means of 
features including obesity, smoking, street drinking, rowdiness, teenage 
pregnancy, unemployment and, surprisingly, one particular fashion feature. 
Soccer player Wayne Rooney would be the archetypical chav. In getting the right 
amount of  recognisable ‘chav’, a very small semiotic dose is in fact enough for a 
certain identity discourse to be activated. Here the metaphor of medication is 
perhaps useful: just as the pain killer we take to get rid of a headache features 
one active substance in the dose that takes away the pain – while the rest of the 
content can in fact be totally irrelevant for achieving that aim – in producing an 
authentic identity all is needed is one active substance in the dose.  
 
 
Figure 2: Chav smiley 
As we can see from Figures 1 and 23, in the case of producing ‘chav’ this ‘active 
substance’ is the fashion feature we mentioned above: the British luxury brand 
Burberry, with its fingerprint tartan pattern. Burberry manufactures a wide 
range of products, such as clothing, shoes and accessories, and as a brand has 
become emblematic of the working-class chav culture. The fact that this often 
takes place in the form of counterfeit Burberry products is of no major 
importance as such: it may in fact be essential for the products themselves to be 
‘fake’ in the production of an authentic ‘chav’. Whether ‘real’ Burberry or not, the 
brand itself is indeed emblematic of ‘chav’ to the extent that the Burberry check 
                                                        
3 All the images and web information appearing in this paper were retrieved on June 28, 2011.  
 10 
is also enough in itself to turn other cultural products into ‘chav’ – as in the case 
of Chav Guevara (Figure 3.).  
 
 
Figure 3: Chav Guevara 
Turning Che Guevara into Chav Guevara by presenting him in the Burberry check 
pattern points to a significant, more general aspect in identity work. 
Administering the right amount of specific semiotic features is at the core of 
authenticity: being an authentic someone requires orientations towards certain 
resources that index a particular desired identity, and, as with chav identity, the 
dose of resources can be minimal, almost homeopathic. The dose can be small, 
but the only thing that is required is that it is enough – enough to produce a 
recognisable identity as an authentic someone. And as the illustrations here 
make clear: this single emblematic feature can be applied in an almost infinite 
range of cases, redefining every object into a ‘chav’ object. On the Internet, we 
find underwear, cars and houses coated in the Burberry tartan, along with 
almost every imaginable cartoon figure and superhero. The ‘active substance’ of 
chavness can be blended with almost any other substance to produce the same 
‘real’, ‘true’, ‘authentic’ and, above all, instantly recognizable image: the ‘chav’. 
 
Enoughness in action 2: Is this pub Irish enough? 
The second vignette illustrating the processes described in this paper engages 
with a globalized social and cultural icon, to be found at present in almost any 
large and middle-size city of the Western world and many parts of the non-
western world as well. Wherever it occurs, the Irish pub is instantly 
recognizable. And as we have seen in the previous example, this recognizability 
is triggered by the use of a small set of ‘active substances’ that, when present in 
the right dose, lend a pub its instant identification as ‘Irish’. The active 
substances are objects and artefacts people orient towards in an attempt to 
construct authenticity. 
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The Irish pub is undoubtedly an instance of the ‘invention of tradition’ 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), something which has been developed quite 
recently as a particular iconic place breathing a kind of fundamental ‘Irishness’ 
inscribed in its layout, spatial organization, furniture and products on offer. As 
for the latter, there is little doubt that the Guinness beer brand has been 
instrumental in developing and promoting this worldwide ‘standard’, so to 
speak. The Irish pub is an artefact of globalized commodification. 
As a globalized commodity, it has become extraordinarily successful. In Belgium 
alone, 86 ‘Irish pubs’ are listed on www.cafe.be, the main website on cafés in 
Belgium. Most, if not all of them are of course run by Belgian publicans; 
customers would be served in the language of the place and some of the staff 
working in such pubs have never visited Ireland. Such Irish pubs do in fact 
present a blend of local and global features; the presence of the globalized 
features turns them into instantly recognizable Irish pubs; the local features 
ensure that the overwhelmingly local customers do not feel out of place in such 
pubs. 
Let us now turn to the globalized features, the ‘active substances’ as we called 
them. Running through about one hundred Irish pub websites (and having 
visited a good number of such pubs ourselves), we see that a small handful of 
emblematic features appear in almost every case; we can list them. But before 
we do that, let us have a look at one illustration, in which we see several of the 
emblematic items. In Figure 4, we see a coaster from an Irish pub in the small 
Belgian town of Zottegem: 
 
Figure 4: Paddy’s Pub, Zottegem. www.irishpub.eu 
1. Pubs have a recognizable Irish name. This name can be a family name. From 
the list of Belgian Irish pubs, we note: Blarney, Conway, Fabian O’Farrell, 
Finnegan, Kate Whelan, Kelly, Kitty O’Shea, Mac Sweeney, Mac Murphy, Maguire, 
McCormack, Molly Malone, Murphy, O’Fianch, O’Malley, O’Reilly, O’Dwyer, Paddy, 
Patrick Foley, Scruffy O’Neill, Sean O’Casey. Apart from a name, an identifiably 
Irish word can be used, such as ‘An Sibhin’ or ‘The Ceilidh’.  Alternatively, the 
pub’s name refers to Irish symbols such as the Shamrock, or to well-known 
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characters from Irish literature such as Molly Bloom. And words such as ‘Irish’ 
and ‘Celtic’ can also be used to flag the Irishness of the pub. 
2. There would be a preference for a particular kind of Celtic lettering in shop 
signs and advertisement boards; this can be done ‘completely’ or by 
approximation. In Figure 4 we see a rather amateurish attempt in ‘Zottegem’, 
where especially the ‘e’, the ‘g’ and the ‘m’ have a Celtic twist.  
3. Some stock symbols of Ireland would be present. The official website 
http://www.of-ireland.info/symbol.html lists the following canon of five 
‘symbols of Ireland’: the flag, the shamrock, the harp, the Celtic cross and the ring 
of Claddagh. The three-leaf clover, shamrock would be present in almost every 
case – see Figure 4. The Irish harp would also be quite frequently used, certainly 
when Guinness beer is advertised; less used are the Irish flag and the Celtic cross. 
We have not found instances of the use of the ring of Claddagh. Also quite 
widespread as a symbol of elementary Irishness is the color green – see again 
Figure 4 above, where green dominates the coaster as well as the clothes of the 
figures depicted in it. 
4. Irish pubs would almost always advertise music as part of their character and 
attractiveness. Evening shows with live bands, often performing folk music, are 
quite a widespread feature of Irish pubs, and one Belgian Irish pub is called after 
the legendary folk band ‘The Dubliners’. Other Irish stars such as Van Morrison 
and U2 would be mentioned, and theme nights would be organized around their 
music.  
5. Finally, some products are omnipresent. Guinness beer is undoubtedly the 
indispensible commodity on offer in any Irish pub. Jameson whiskey is another 
very frequent item on offer, and both would often be visibly advertised from the 
outside of the pub. Other ‘typical’ products would be Kilkenny’s beer and Irish 
cider; when food is offered, Irish lamb stew and Irish steak would very often be 
found on the menu. 
These five elements dominate the Irish pubs in Belgium; no doubt, they will be 
found elsewhere around the world as well.4 They combine in a rustic, dark wood 
and brass interior to form a kind of cosiness welcomed by customers. The 
Zottegem Paddy’s Pub summarizes its character as follows: 
“The Paddy’s pub is an Irish pub where everyone feels at home and makes 
oneselfs comfortable (sic). It’s got everything you can find in an Irish pub, 
nice music, Irish whiskeys, Guinness, Kilkenny, Adam’s Apple, Irish food 
combined with European dishes, in a word, a part of Ireland in Zottegem 
Belgium.” 
                                                        
4 A possible sixth feature could be this. Almost all pubs would organize a St Patrick’s Day event. 
Customers are requested to dress in green colors that day, and substantial drinking at discount 
prices would be the backbone of the event; live bands would perform as well. 
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Note the Belgian accent in Paddy’s English, and observe the statement “Irish food 
combined with European dishes” – which summarizes what we intended to 
demonstrate. Irish pubs blend a small dose of emblematic globalized Irishness 
with a whole lot of local and other features. Guinness and cider are flanked by 
solidly Belgian beers such as Jupiler and Leffe on tap. So too with food: apart 
from the Irish lamb stew and the Irish Angus beef, Irish pubs in Belgium offer the 
same snacks and meals as those offered by non-Irish pubs in many places around 
the world. O’Reilly’s in Brussels, for instance, offers some iconic Irish food along 
with buffalo wings, beef and veggie nachos, hamburgers (with Irish beef), as well 
as the very English fish and chips and Sunday roast 
(http://oreillys.nl/brussels/menu/7-food-menu.html). And in many pubs, a 
choice of Irish whiskies would be complemented by a rich variety of original 
Scotch malts. Irishness can be extended, as we can see, into a broader realm of 
Anglo-saxon-ness. Needless to say, nevertheless, that almost every Irish pub 
advertises itself as authentically Irish. 
Is there a critical limit to the amount of emblematicity that a place ought to 
display in order to be a recognizably ‘Irish’ pub in Belgium? When is a pub ‘Irish 
enough’ to pass credibly as such? From our observations, we see that at least 
some of the features listed above are mandatory. One feature is not enough: a 
pub called ‘Sean O’Reilly’s’ but not serving Guinness or other Irish products 
would not easily be recognized as ‘Irish’ (“what! You don’t have Guinness?!”); in 
the opposite case, it is not enough to serve Guinness to qualify as an Irish pub. 
Irish pubs need to look and feel Irish, and they achieve that by means of a bundle 
of emblematic features: a name, a choice of products, displays of the shamrock or 
the harp, the color green, and so forth. The bundle, however, should not be too 
big. A pub which is so Irish that customers are required to speak English in order 
to get their orders passed, for instance, would not be too long in business in a 
town such as Zottegem. The same would apply to pubs that would only welcome 
Irish customers.5 Irish pubs are globalized in a familiar way: a small but highly 
relevant bundle of globalized emblematic features is blended with a high dose of 
firmly local features. Customers can feel at home in Zottegem while they are, 
simultaneously, savoring an ‘authentically Irish’ pub ambiance. By entering an 
Irish pub, the local customers do not become Irish; nor would they have to, and 
that is the whole point: one merely enters a niche of Irishness. 
 
Enough is enough 
In the two illustrations we gave, we have seen how authenticity is manufactured 
by blending a variety of features, some of which – the defining ones – are 
sufficient to produce the particular targeted authentic identity. In the case of the 
chav, one single feature was enough to define almost any other object as ‘chav’; 
in the case of Irish pubs, the bundle was larger and more complex, but still 
essentially quite limited: a small dose of ‘active substance’ that turned pubs into 
Irish pubs in so many places in the world. In many ways, this process reminds us 
                                                        
5 A very small number of exceptions exist, mostly in larger cities such as Antwerp and Brussels, 
targeting English-speaking expatriates. 
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of what we know as ‘accent’: globalized identities are not absorbed in toto; they 
become an accent, a kind of inflection of other identities. This accented package – 
a-sufficiently-Irish-pub-in-Zottegem – is what we now understand as identity. 
We can see the particular configurations of features mentioned above as the 
‘micro-hegemonies’ mentioned earlier. In different niches of our social and 
cultural lives, we arrange features in such a way that they enable others to 
identify us as ‘authentic’, ‘real’ members of social groups, even if this authenticity 
comes with a lower rank as ‘apprentice’ within a particular field. We enter and 
leave these niches often in rapid sequence, changing footing and style each time 
and deploying the resources we have collected for performing each of these 
identities – our identity repertoire is the key to what we can be or can perform – 
in social life. 
Enoughness judgments determine the ways in which one can rise from the 
apprentice rank to higher, more authoritative ranks – apprentices orient towards 
the ‘full’ authenticity while they start building their own restricted versions of it. 
Fans of Irish pubs, for instance, would begin to exhibit and develop their fanship 
by collecting ‘Irish’ objects: green top hats, shamrock coasters, Guinness beer 
glasses, Irish national team soccer jerseys and so on. They gather objects that 
culturally bespeak ‘Irishness’ – such Irishness that can align them with the object 
they orient towards, the Irish pub and beyond it, an imaginary essential 
Irishness. Throughout all of this we see that ‘culture’ appears as that which 
provides (enough) meaning, i.e. makes practices and statements sufficiently 
recognizable for others as productions of identities. And throughout all of this, 
we see such cultures as things that are perpetually subject to learning practices. 
One is never a ‘full’ member of any cultural system, because the configurations of 
features are perpetually changing, and one’s fluency of yesterday need not 
guarantee fluency tomorrow. In the same move, we of course see how such 
processes involve a core of perpetually shifting normativities (the things that 
enable recognizability and, thus, meaning), and because of that, power – power 
operating at a variety of scale levels in a polycentric sociocultural environment 
in which all of us, all the time, are required to satisfy the rules of recognizability. 
All of this can be empirically investigated; it enables us to use an anti-essentialist 
framework that, however, does not lapse into a rhetoric of fragmentation and 
contradiction, but attempts to provide a realistic account of identity practices. 
Such practices, one will observe in a variety of domains, revolve around a 
complex and unpredictable notion of authenticity, which in turn rests on 
judgments of enoughness. The concise framework sketched here can serve as a 
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Chapter 2: 
Culture as accent 
 
Introduction 
Let us open with a mundane but telling example. Figure 1 shows an 
advertisement that was part of a campaign a couple of years ago. The well-
known beer brand Carlsberg here advertises a new bottle. 
 
Figure 1: probably the best bottle in the world 
Isn’t this interesting: a massive worldwide advertisement campaign is launched 
about the new shape of a beer bottle. The beer itself – what most people would 
perceive as the commodity to be purchased – remains unaltered; what changes is 
the packaging, the container in which the beer is sold. What is advertised and 
marketed here is a detail of the whole commodity, a non-essential aspect of it. Or 
is it? 
We see in our present ways of life how often the things that are construed and 
presented as relevant or crucial are in actual fact details, hardly fundamental 
aspects of something bigger and more encompassing. Thus, this paper intends to 
draw attention to the very small proportion of cultural material that seems to 
matter in many aspects of everyday life: the fact that in a world which otherwise 
revolves around strong tendencies towards uniformity, small – very small – 
differences acquire the status of fundamental aspects of being. Identities and 
senses of ‘being oneself’ are based on and grounded in miniscule deviations from 
standard formats and scripts that organize most of what this ‘being oneself’ is 
actually about. This pattern, in which culture increasingly appears as an ‘accent’, 
an inflection of standard codes and norms, is part of consumer culture. In that 
sense, it is old – remember Marcuse’s one-dimensional man (1964) and 
Bourdieu’s remarkably stable class-structuring patterns of cultural distinction 
(1984). But the increased speed and intensity that characterizes the present 
economy of cultural forms and that finds its expressions in the widespread 
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intensive use of online social media makes these patterns more visible and less 
escapable as objects of reflection. It also turns our attention towards 
superdiversity as an area in which processes of cultural production and 
reproduction may acquire new – or at least visible – features, demanding new 
productive reflection and analysis (cf Blommaert & Rampton 2011). 
This paper has limited ambitions. We intend to provide a rough outline of the 
two forces we observe and we see as defining this pattern of culture-as-accent: a 
strong tendency towards uniformity and homogeneity on the one hand, and the 
inflation of details as metonymic marks of the total person on the other. Both 
forces co-occur in a dialectic in which the very forces of homogenization are 
always ‘footnoted’, so to speak, by strong and outspoken tendencies towards 
inflating and overvaluing details. In fact, much of contemporary cultural life can 
perhaps best be described as ‘uniformity-with-a-minor-difference’, and 
consumer capitalism plays into both apparently contradictory forces. The 
clearest examples of these patterns can thus be found in advertisements, and 
most of the illustrations we shall use in this paper are taken from that domain. 
The regimented society 
Our times are not different from most of Modernity – an era characterized by a 
tension between individualism and society, between an ideology of individual 
achievement and accomplishment, and the homogenizing pressures of an 
increasingly integrated society (see Fromm 1941 for an excellent discussion; 
also Entwistle 2000: 114-117, drawing on Simmel 1971). Consumer capitalism 
places itself right in the nexus of this tension, emphasizing individual choice 
while at the same time aiming at mass comsumption of similar products. 
Remember that Marcuse saw this feature as defining consumer capitalism: the 
paradox that we seem to believe that we are all unique individuals when we all 
wear the same garments, eat the same food and listen to the same music. This 
exploitation of an ideological false consciousness was, for Marcuse, the reason to 
see consumer capitalism as a form of totalitarianism. It was also Marcuse who 
identified the behavioral and social outcome of this: the fact that people’s 
consumption practices become the key to their social life. It is on the basis of 
shared consumption – owning or admiring similar commodities – that people 
form social groups. Identities are shaped by consumer behavior, and Bourdieu’s 
Distinction provided powerful empirical arguments for this. 
Marcuse’s thesis has been under fire for decades because of the totalizing and 
less than nuanced nature of his analysis (as well as, politically, the assumptions 
he used). Yet, the way our societies have of late developed may offer 
opportunities to return to the essence of the argument.  
Marcuse identified as false consciousness the fact that people, in order to 
participate in the totalitarian consumption modes, offer themselves to 
exploitation. The money required to purchase cars, refrigerators and television 
sets was earned by working longer and harder – by enabling the very producers 
of consumer commodities, in other words, to maximize profits by maximizing 
workers’ exploitation. This opportunity for false consciousness (i.e. for the 
‘ideological lie’ at the heart of the system) was predicated on a fully integrated 
society in which commodities circulated with speed and intensity, and in which 
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messages and images about such commodities – advertisement – appeared as 
the fuel driving this mode of intense circulation. People can only project 
particular ideas of identity onto, say, ownership of a BMW, when these ideas 
have been in circulation and have socially been enregistered, when they have 
become part of the common set of meaning-giving resources in a society. It is 
only, to adopt Bourdieu’s terminology for a moment, when a field has been 
shaped that people can take positions in that field. Concretely: we can only see 
our purchase of a BMW as an act of identity when other people see it in similar 
terms. We can then convert the fundamentally unfree relationship that is at the 
core of this transaction (someone paying a determined amount of money as a 
prerequisite for acquiring a commodity, in this case a BMW car) into something 
else: ‘choice’, the practice of selecting from within a huge range of alternatives, 
by a free and unconstrained individual. Choice has become the concept that 
embodies the ideological lie identified by Marcuse. It is in the ideological 
construction of ‘choice’ that we convert an unfree structure of market 
transaction into a practice that is the pinnacle of freedom: buying something 
after a process of selection, in which we compare and assess immaterial features 
of the commodities on offer – their ‘mythologies’ in the sense of Roland Barthes 
(1957). It is in this process, too, that we convert consumption from a transaction 
between two parties into an act that bespeaks just the consumer’s identity, into 
something that is about ‘me’ and ‘who I am’, not about the seller’s bank account 
(cf. Cronin’s [2000] ‘compulsory individuality’). 
There is no doubt that our era differs from preceding ones in terms of the speed 
and intensity of the circulation of messages and images on almost any aspect of 
life, online as well as ‘offline’, effective as well as aspirational. The internet has 
become a vast forum for the marketing of commodities, culture and selves, one of 
the spaces where superdiversity appears most visibly and palpably. It has 
shaped (and this process is not finished) a degree of integration to our societies 
probably unparalleled in history, and this in the face of an ever-growing increase 
in complexity and diversity. And with this increasing integration comes a range 
of social and cultural phenomena perhaps not new in substance but surely in 
degree, scope and intensity. As to scope: many of these phenomena are now 
effectively global and have become part of the general sociocultural scripts of 
populations in almost every part of the world. There is no need at this point to 
elaborate; a booming literature is documenting this process (e.g. Appadurai 
1996; Jenkins 2006; Varis & Wang 2011). 
This increased integration shapes and reshapes a plethora of fields: any aspect of 
human life can now be organized into structured and ordered mini-systems, 
which we called elsewhere ‘micro-hegemonies’ (Blommaert & Varis 2011). That 
is, miniscule aspects of life can be shaped now as targets for ordering practices 
related to commodification, and all of these fields are now subject to ‘how to’ 
discourses, to forms of regimentation and submission to ideals, strategic 
objectives and targets, and to infinitely detailed patterns of ‘management’ (i.e. 
homogenizing discipline) and accounting practices. In that sense, what we 
currently witness on the internet is an infinitely fractal reproduction of the 
sociocultural domains sketched in Bourdieu’s Distinction, a degree of elaboration 
and detail which is, in principle as well as in actual fact, infinite. The Foucaultian 
tension between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, absorbed into elaborate practices of 
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‘care of the self’, is quite inescapable as a point of reference here (Foucault 1988, 
2003). 
These fields now cover every aspect of human life, and for every aspect we see 
the appearance of micro-hegemonic norms and standards: the body, food, art, 
work, mobility, dress, the mind, education, name it. Figure 2 provides a self-
evident illustration of this: the way in which a female body is defined in terms of 
an ideal (or at least ‘better’) ‘goal weight’. Figure 3 instantly connects this 
standard of a slim, fit and healthy female body to consumption – healthy food 
habits. In this illustration we see how aspects of human life – aspects which 
many people would understand as belonging to the private sphere – are 
intertwined with consumption behavior. 
 
 
Figure 2: goal weight 
 
Figure 3: healthy eating 
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Barthes, in another influential book, sketched the difference between ‘clothes’ 
and ‘fashion’ as grounded not in objective features of the objects themselves, but 
in their subjective ‘adjectives’, so to speak, in the mythological attributes that 
particular clothes acquired through elaborate discourses on quality, style and 
class distinction; such discourses were developed and circulated in the ‘fashion’ 
magazines, and they determined the commodity price of the garments (Barthes 
1983). We now see that ‘fashion’, defined in those terms, has extended into an 
immense terrain of social and cultural life and that, in each of these now 
fashionable domains, we witness the emergence and consolidation of complexes 
of instruction and prescription, management and monitoring, identity effects – 
and all of this deeply interwoven with commodification. Healthy food can be 
purchased and demands investments in terms of ‘choice’; physical beauty and 
fitness can also be purchased, and while all of this used to be a rather ‘organic’ 
matter closely tied to one’s general lifestyle – fitness and physical prowess for 
instance being associated with hard physical labor, as in Zola’s Bête Humaine – 
all of these things have now become segmented and detached items subject to a 
normative regime and driven by consumption patterns. We have moved from 
one lifestyle to an infinite range of lifestyles, all of which are now objects of 
discursive and semiotic elaboration and all of which can now be seen as 
elementary aspects of the self.6  
We thus witness an ordered and subjected self remarkably at odds with the 
ideologies of freedom that surround it, a self that needs to establish and maintain 
order over a distributed complex of micro-selves, each of which can define how 
others perceive, understand and evaluate us. 7 For each new segment of social 
and cultural life that becomes detached and organized as a space of discipline 
and order, becomes in the same move a space of social evaluation, something 
about which others can pass hard and uncompromising judgments. Such 
judgments are fundamentally rooted in recognizability: I recognize this or that 
aspect of behaviour as being indexical of, say, elegance, intelligence and 
sophistication, or of poor taste, weakness of character or judgment, boorishness 
or ‘wannabe’-ship. And I can recognize this because – pace Bourdieu – I share the 
codes and conventions of this field with others. In semiotic terms, I recognize 
things because of the relative degree of uniformity they dispay in relation to a 
particular (usually ideal, i.e. imagined) standard. Thus, recognizability is a key 
feature of how we organize the many aspects of social and cultural life; we will 
strive towards maximum recognizability in most of what we do and our worst 
                                                        
6 See Blommaert (2010: 47ff) for an illustration of ‘American accent’ being sold over the 
internet. It is an example of the infinite detailing of commodification we observe here. 
7 Thus, every technological innovation creates in essence a free and unscripted space, 
but becomes in practice a space filled in no time by prescriptions and norms. The social 
media are case in point. While they are ideologically often seen as a space for individual 
exploration and articulation, an avalanche of books on ‘how to be a star on Facebook’ 
have appeared, replete with detailed descriptions of how much to write, how often, and 
to whom. See e.g. Deckers & Lacy (2010) for an example of the micro-practices entailed 
in ‘self-branding’ online.  
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anxieties are often about not being recognized as that which we aspire to be. 
Recognizability also has to do with degrees of doing: in our endeavours to be 
someone or something, we can be judged as complete failures (e.g. as ‘trashy’ 
when trying to be ‘classy’) or failures to a degree (hence ‘wannabes’ – people 
who almost get the micro-management right, but not quite so) – also depending 
on the context of evaluation, and the evaluator.  
Consider Figure 4, and observe especially the almost instant recognizability of 
the complex of semiotic features we can label – i.e. recognize – as ‘business 
culture’, ‘managerial style’, inscribed in dress, make-up, mood (smiling faces, i.e. 
optimism and congeniality), the organization of bodies in space, and the 
orientation towards objects such as laptops and documents. 
 
Figure 4: Management team 
Recognizability is about getting all the details right, about composing a jigsaw of 
features that are in line with the normative expactations that generate 
reconizability. Such arrangements are intricate and put pressure on the 
resources people have at their disposal; they are compelling, and not only in 
dominant sociocultural strata, as we can see from Figure 5: make-up guidelines 
for a Gothic woman. Here we can see how even ‘deviant’, i.e. subcultural 
identities operate on the basis of compelling guidelines and instructions. 
Subcultures are as normative as mainstream ones, and deviating from norms 
always amounts to trading one set of norms for another. Rejections of cultural 
scripts involve complex and demanding scripts themselves, often in response to 
the ‘Why?’ question that employing certain cultural scripts and consequently 
ignoring others elicit from our fellow human beings (hence, e.g. ‘Why are you not 
on Facebook?’). And increasing social and cultural superdiversity provokes an 
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intensification of such questions, alongside an escalation of the ‘how to’ practices 
into new social and cultural fields (as e.g. wearing a Muslim headscarf or ‘hijab’; 
see the next chapter). 
 
Figure 5: Gothic make-up guidelines 
As said, globalization has turned these patterns of recognizability – of semiotic 
homogeneity, in other words – into worldwide scripts for social and cultural life. 
Patterns of uniformity acquire recognizability across borders, driven as they are 
by a consumption capitalism that looks for market expansion for the same 
products. Conformity is a market ideal; it is also turning into a social and cultural 
ideal. The internet with its global reach and increasing availability strongly 
contributes to this, and we participate en masse on online platforms that are 
supposedly about self-actualization and the freedom to connect, yet run by 
companies that are making a lot of money out of our identity work. Thus, we 
have “standardized presences on sites like Facebook” (Lanier 2010: 16): sites 
that, while getting rich on advertising money, provide strict cultural scripts and 
templates for self-representation which can lead to, in efforts to conform, “self-
policing to the point of trying to achieve a precorrected self” (Turkle 2011: 258). 
All of this sounds perhaps as pessimistic as Marcuse’s old statements, and to 
some degree it is – as Appadurai (1996: 7) puts it, “where there is consumption 
there is pleasure, and where there is pleasure there is agency. Freedom, on the 
other hand, is a rather more elusive commodity.” But there is another side to the 
coin, and simplistic cultural defeatism is not a feasible approach. 
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The inflation of details 
While we see the tremendous pressures towards conformity as the key to many 
contemporary aspects of life, we also witness how these processes of 
homogenization inevitably contain a small space for ‘uniqueness’. And this small 
space is a space of details – the space in which while most of our behaviour is 
fundamentally in line with the micro-hegemonies that regulate it. In this space 
we do place some accents, small deviations we call characteristics of our own 
uniqueness.  These deviations can be, and usually are, extremely small – they can 
even be invisible to most people; see the small tattoo on the woman’s body in 
Figure 6. The tattoo would be visible only when the body is uncovered – its 
default invisibility here is the whole point. 
 
Figure 6: an invisible tattoo 
Note also, in Figure 7, how extremely small differences appear to invoke a broad 
and deep complex of differences in ‘style’ and thence, in ‘personality’. The three 
suits worn here are fundamentally overwhelmingly similar. Differences in color, 
cut, and attributes (e.g. the watch chain) determine the ways in which we project 
larger complexes of distinction onto the small differences. We are witnessing 
here the fundamental semiotic mechanism at work: details are metonymically 
inflated so as to stand for something far bigger and more profound, a difference 
in ‘personality’, i.e. in the script I offer to others as the way in which they should 
read and recognize me. 
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Figure 7: three different suits 
‘Choice’, now, is located in the nano-politics of these details. As said, the system 
of consumer capitalism drifts strongly towards conformity. Goods can only yield 
maximum profits when they can be standardized and sold to huge numbers of 
customers. So what we see is that our actual range of ‘choice’ is severely 
restricted: we can choose between small differences, we move within a narrow 
bandwidth of choice. All cars are in essence very similar, and their key features 
and characteristics are entirely predictable. Within this overwhelming similarity 
of objects, we distinguish between brands, models, colors, options and gadgets 
and believe such choices are fundamental. We believe they reflect our most 
essential personality features, we believe that others will also recognize us in 
those terms, and we know that such choices will have effects on the price of the 
commodity we purchase. In actual fact, whenever we make such intricate 
choices, we make them within a very narrow range of differences, none of which 
are in themselves fundamental, but all of which have been made to be seen as 
fundamental by means of the mythologization described by Barthes discussing 
the ‘new Citroën’.  
Producers play into this pattern, by continuously suggesting and emphasizing 
that the choice for a particular detail over others both reflects who you are and 
creates you in that way. Your ‘accent’, so to speak, thereby becomes the totality 
of your personality, and every possible choice you make in consumption is likely 
to trigger these metonymic associative attributions. Figures 8 and 9 provide 
illustrations for this. 
In Figure 8 we see the actor John Travolta in an advertisement by the luxury 
watch brand Breitling. The message in the advertisement is that, while Travolta 
is universally known as an actor, this is just his ‘career’; in actual fact, he is a 
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pilot, and this more adventurous (and again, invisible) identity of his is projected 
onto the Breitling watch. Breitling indexes who Travolta really is. 
 
Figure 8: the real John Travolta 
And Figure 9 shows us ‘the Bentley man’: an older and manifestly affluent man – 
tailored suit, classic haircut, and the Chesterfield sofa – who tells the rest of the 
world to sod off – the middle finger. The Bentley, that’s me, is the message. Again, 
this is not a ‘me’ people would often see (since I’m a distinguished gentleman I 
probably don’t show my middle finger as a routine), but that is the point: this is 
my true self, the self most people don’t usually see. In a classic metaphor, the true 
self is hidden, invisible and only perceivable to some – and on the basis of details 
that should be read in a particular way. The hidden tattoo reflects the true 
personality of the woman in Figure 6, the chain watch that of a person who 
wears that particular suit; the Breitling watch is the index towards Travolta’s 
true personality, and the Bentley car reveals that the man behind the wheel is 
someone who does what he likes and does not care about what others think of 
him.  
All of those small signals need to be read as indicative of the whole personality. 
Anyone who observes advertisements every once in a while will not fail to pick 
this up. While every commodity is in itself mundane and trivial, advertisements 
produce the ‘adjectives’ that make some objects stand out and become 
‘distinguished’ and distinguishing for those who purchase them. In a world of 
conformity, even such details – the stuff that makes us unique, that creates our 
‘accent’ – are offered along lines of conformity and submission. 
At the same time, however, we do see agency here. The consumer is not just 
someone who consumes – passively absorbs and unintentionally reproduces the 
commodity’s indexicals – but someone who produces a specific and ordered self 
through these acts of reproduction. At this point, we have to leave the imagery of 
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the ‘cultural junkie’ so often present in culture critique, of masses put to sleep by 
silly television programs and consumer habits. Someone who wears a Nike T-
shirt, with the brand visible to all, not just submits to the order imposed by Nike, 
the producer. S/he also consciously produces him/herself in a particular identity 
format. Of late this dialectic understanding of such processes have been captured 
under the neologism ‘prosumer’ – a consumer who at the same time produces 
something (say, a YouTube film or a Facebook entry; see Leppänen & Häkkinen 
2012). The ‘prosumer’ may be present across the whole spectre of consumer 
society, in fact drive that whole system by its dialectic of consuming and 
producing; and the more compelling the rules of consumer culture become, the 
more we will see the productive side of this oppression – it will, each time, create 
someone in a particular format of recognizability. There is, thus creativity in this 
process as we actively ‘work on our accents’. The creativity is seriously 
constrained, but it is there nevertheless (cf Blommaert 2005, chapter 5). 
 
 






There are numerous stories about the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, especially 
about the astonishment and inarticulateness of East-German citizens when they 
entered West-German supermarkets for the first time. When confronted with 
shelves containing dozens of brands of shampoo, they just did not know what to 
choose and asked more familiar customers what the differences in price between 
shampoo A and shampoo B reflected. Was shampoo B better? Did the bottle of B 
contain more shampoo than that of A? Were the cheaper ones harmful? And why 
were larger bottles sometimes cheaper than smaller ones? It took West-Germans 
a lot of thinking before they could answer such – altogether rather obvious – 
questions. 
The East-Germans showed us something quite important: that in consumer 
culture, details are the true objects of marketing. It is the suggestion that 
products do not differ superficially, but that these superficial differences are in 
fact fundamental ones – so fundamental that a choice for or against them would 
reveal our true selves, both to ourselves and to others. Consequently, we 
surround ourselves with elaborate discourses on the importance of details, and 
have now turned our whole life into a rhetorical complex in which we rationalize 
our choices and preferences for particular details. We are now held accountable 
for every choice we make in life, and the worst possible answer when someone 
asks why we have chosen this commodity over another is ‘I don’t know’. Since 
every choice is seen as possibly defining our true selves because it always can be 
seen as derived from what we are ‘deep down, we need to explain and 
rationalize all of our choices. Social media become a landscape full of accounting 
practices, in which we construct elaborate and infintely detailed life-projects, 
dispersed over a myriad of aspects of behavior and life. Each of these aspects, we 
have seen, is subject to standards, to normative expectations. Yet, we continue to 
see them as fundamental of our total being, as reflective of our true, unique 
selves, of our authenticity. Authenticity, in turn, emerges as the battleground for 
cultural practices in superdiversity, with an expansion and intensification of the 
fields and objects arpound which authenticity can be articulated and contested 
(cf Blommaert & Varis 2011). 
The overall picture we get from this is that of culture as an accent. Most of what 
we do in organizing our lives is oriented towards conformity to others. This is a 
compelling thing, because we need this level of conformity in order to be 
recognizable by others, in order to make sense to them. Culture, after all, is that 
which provides meaning in human societies. But at the same time, we 
continuously create ‘accents’ in relation to the standards we have to submit to: 
we construct very small spaces of uniqueness, of things that we believe we do 
not share with others. I also wear a suit but with a different necktie; and I wear a 
Breitling watch which, to some, will tell that I’m in fact and deep down a non-suit 
person, someone who loves the outdoor, a rugged man of action. Armed with 
these paraphernalia, we enter the daily social arena in search of recognition, 
both as someone who fits a broad category, and as someone who deviates from 
it. It is because of these deviations that others will perhaps find me more 
interesting than most, a more layered and mysterious character, someone 
creative and inventive – so creative and inventive that I create ‘my own style’ by 
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means of a unique combination of features, all of which can be read 
metonymically in relation to social categories, and all of which will provoke 
judgments by others. 
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Chapter 3: 
How to ‘how to’? The prescriptive micropolitics of Hijabista 
 
Introduction  
Identities have always been subject to prescriptive ‘how to’ discourses; there is 
or has been no lack of guides and instructors for identities.8 The expansion of 
identity repertoires that we currently witness in the context of superdiversity 
naturally comes with an expansion of ‘how to’ literature, and the Internet is the 
prime vehicle for this. We see a mushrooming of self-help and ‘how to’ websites, 
films and social media groups, all targeting specific modes of behavior and thus 
aimed at producing people recognizable as X or Y. From ‘how to be a Goth’ to 
‘how to become a Facebook star’, over ‘How to trick people into thinking you’re 
good looking’ and ‘How to know if you’re a metrosexual’: the list of potential 
targets for prescriptive discourse and illustration is endless and appears to 
respond to an increasing demand. YouTube, for instance, abounds with such 
material – how to dress like a skateboarder; how to be a good husband; how to 
be more feminine, etc.; ‘Howto and Style’ is also, together with for instance 
‘Music’, ‘Education’, ‘Sports’ and ‘Pets and animals’, one on the list of 17 main 
categories for browsing videos on http://www.youtube.com/. 
These prescriptive ‘how to’ discourses have a clear scope and they operate on a 
series of assumptions that, recapitulating arguments developed elsewhere, we 
can sketch as follows. Acquiring and assembling identities are matters of 
perfection and exact precision; when appropriately practiced, they achieve 
recognizability for you as someone or a certain kind of person. In fact, identity 
work boils down to collecting and arranging a bundle of small details measured 
as to their appropriateness and ‘enoughness’, the ordered display of which 
generates recognizability as X or Y. Hence, say, dressing almost like a 
skateboarder is not quite good enough, as combining skater wear with, for 
instance, cowboy boots (at first sight a harmless detail) will ultimately lead to a 
failed projection of ‘skateboarder’ identity. One is ‘not enough’ of a skater and 
‘too much’ of something else. Perfection and precision, thus, require sustained 
and disciplined focus on the detailed micro-practices of ‘getting it right’. These 
micro-practices, we argued earlier, are governed by ‘micro-hegemonies’: specific 
sets of norms that dictate the place of certain details in the ordered bundles that 
produce identities. Consequently, small changes in style – changing one detail 
sometimes – provoke big changes in identities, because such small changes 
rearrange and reorder the whole bundle. Every detail, thus, can be seen as in 
need of organization and ordering, and can so become an object of ‘how to’ 
discourse (Blommaert & Varis 2011, 2012).  
In this chapter, we focus on a phenomenon called the Hijabista, and the online 
‘how to’ literature that attempts to regulate this phenomenon. Hijab refers to the 
                                                        
8 A profoundly revised version of this paper, incorporating also a strongly 
revised and abbreviated version of chapter 2, appeared in Semiotica (2014). 
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sartorial norms, including the head cover, observed by Muslim women, and to 
the ‘modest’ style of Muslim women in general. Hijabistas, then, are Muslim 
women who dress ‘fashionably’ and/or design fashionable clothes, while 
orienting towards what is being prescribed by their religion in terms of dress9. 
Being a hijabista can be seen as a sartorial technology of the self (Foucault 1988; 
see also Fadil 2011 for a discussion on not-veiling as an aesthetic of the self) that 
finds its expression in a complex of micro-practices revolving around 
recognizable emblematic values of fabrics, cuts, accessories and styles. This 
phenomenon is not exclusively visible on the internet, but still very prominent in 
different online environments: one can find blogs (e.g. 
http://www.hijabstyle.co.uk/), shop in online stores (e.g. http://www.hijab-
ista.com/), watch YouTube videos (more on this below), ‘like’ Facebook pages 
(e.g. http://www.facebook.com/Hijabista), and engage in discussion with others 
on these and other sites.  
‘Hijabista’ as a word has its roots in the older ‘fashionista’, which refers to a keen 
follower of fashion and/or someone who dresses up fashionably. ‘Hijab’ is not 
the only word that has been used to form such a ‘fashion portmanteau’ word – 
another example of this would be ‘fatshionista’ (see e.g. Diary of a Fatshionista10). 
As the name suggests, fatshionistas are people who go against the received idea 
that fashion is only for the ‘skinny’, and both hijabistas and fatshionistas can in 
fact be seen as transgressive modes of fashionista, as neither Muslim nor 
overweight women are seen as the ideal targets of the prescriptive discourse on 
acceptable Western female bodies regulating their desired shape and the ways in 
which they should be (un)covered.  
The relationship between Islam, female fashion and individuality has in fact been 
fraught with conflicts. In 1994 an international row broke out when Chanel 
designer Karl Lagerfeld showed a dress on which verses from the Qur’an were 
printed. Globalized fashion, so it seemed, should not in any way be confused with 
the Muslim faith. Conversely, wearing the hijab has in Western societies quite 
consistently been branded as a kind of uniformization of female Muslims, and so 
associated to the denial of individual liberties, the absence of freedom to 
articulate female identities, and the oppression of Muslim women in general. It is 
seen as a remnant of pre-Modernity and pre-Enlightenment, which is why 
Atatürk banned the hijab from his modernized Turkish state and Shah Reza 
Pahlavi banned it from his equally modernized Iran. The same arguments 
motivated a hotly contested debate in France in the 1990s and in several other 
European countries since then, leading to the call by Mr Wilders in The 
                                                        
9 It should be noted that, perhaps in contrast to what is generally believed, the 
issue of head cover and what (not) to wear is by no means a simple ‘Muslim’ 
thing – just one example of these complexities is Brenner’s (1996) discussion of 
Indonesia, pointing to the fact that there, wearing the veil has not necessarily 
been seen as an ‘Islamic’, but as an ‘Arab’ practice. This is a further indexical 
layer in a broader discussion that is unfortunately largely beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
10 http://diaryofafatshionista.com/ 
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Netherlands to introduce a special tax for women who insist on wearing the 
hijab. A large and growing popular and media literature documents such 
conflicting interpretations. Hijabistas, thus, assume a place in an area of 
controversy and conflict. Their sartorial practices need to balance between 
different worlds of interpretation, none of them socioculturally and politically 
innocent.  
‘Western’ fashion is designed to cover specific kinds of bodies, and to a large 
extent cover them only minimally – hence the exclusion of bodies that are seen 
as non-fitting due to their ‘wrong’ shape, as well as the ‘awkward’ mix with 
bodies that are not available for the generous display of bare skin or are not by 
default aiming at attracting (often erotically interpreted) attention to 
themselves. Thus the emergence of niche fashionistas such as fatshionistas and 
hijabistas, with specific micro-hegemonies entailing specific micropractices of 
self-fashioning and self-consciousness. 
These specific micro-practices play into the creation of what we have elsewhere 
(Blommaert & Varis 2012; chapter 2 above) called ‘culture as accent’ – a space 
for uniqueness and individuality within overwhelming pressures towards 
conformity. One’s accent – the details that contribute to the making of one’s 
unique identity – are often the result of very complex articulations where even 
seemingly contradictory identity discourses are brought together for the 
production of the totality that is ‘my (unique) accent’. Articulation, in the words 
of Stuart Hall (1986: 53, emphasis original), is  
(…) the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different 
elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, 
determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under 
what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? The so-called 
‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct 
elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have 
no necessary ‘belongingness’. The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage 
between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, 
under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be 
connected.  
Our accents are the result of specific articulations, and all of this is tied into 
consumer culture and the consumption and display of certain consumer 
commodities. As Entwistle (2000: 124) puts it, in the “production of the ‘body 
beautiful’”, “the modern ‘care of the self’ has become one of the defining features 
of consumer culture. Rather than imposed on us, these practices call us to be self-
conscious and self-disciplining.” The preoccupation with the micro-practices of 
self-in-consumerism is very prominently manifest in e.g. the change of style 
according to occasion, year and season (hence, for instance, the fear of being a 
target of the damning ‘that is so last season’ remark for anyone who wishes to be 
stylish). As for the case of hijabistas, Jones (2007: 211) in her discussion on 
Islamic fashion in Indonesia points to these consumerist articulations as “an 
index of two apparently contradictory or mutually exclusive phenomena, a rise 
in Islamic piety and a rise in consumerism.” However, here we should be wary of 
constructing any essentialist fundamental break between ‘Western’ fashion and 
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‘Muslim’ clothing and of implying the impossibility of combining these two. Just 
because the mix is not necessary does not mean that it is impossible, and, as we 
shall see below in more detail, our late modern consumer culture indeed enables 
and encourages the articulation of a whole range of identities, each with their 
own defining accent. 
The product of engaging in specific practices of articulation is a tailored self – in 
the case of different fashionistas very literally so. This means striking a balance 
between ‘standing out’ and ‘fitting in’: “We can use dress to articulate our sense 
of ‘uniqueness’ to express our difference from others, although as members of 
particular classes and cultures, we are equally likely to find styles of dress that 
connect us to others as well” (Entwistle 2000: 138, 139). It is, as said above, a 
trade-off between conformity and uniqueness. Striking this balance is always 
easy, for one may – either accidentally or on purpose – produce too strong an 
accent that will be the target of criticism, ridicule etc. We will start by looking at 
corrective ‘how to’ discourses on unacceptable accents. 
How (not) to be hijab 
The wish to be recognizable as someone and as a certain kind of person is part of 
the articulation of one’s accent, as the failure to be recognizable as X may lead 
not only into non-recognition, but to the wholesale rejection or disqualification 
of one’s identity (‘misrecognition’, in Bourdieu’s sense). The first step in most of 
the how-to literature is therefore that of demarcation: defining what is in and 
what is out, what is authentic and what is fake, what is enough in the way of 
accent and what is not.  
This is the case also with hijabistas. The three images below, found on different 
online forums, give a taste of the kinds of ongoing battles over acceptable accents 









Image 2. http://www.muslimness.com/2009/11/whats-your-hijab.html  
 
 
Image 3. http://www.turntoislam.com/forum/showthread.php?t=47697  
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When it comes to ‘how to’ discourses on identities, these discourses are always 
accompanied by a ‘how not to’ component explicitly or implicitly embedded in 
the ‘how to’. The prescriptive images presented above are all very explicit, and 
clearly the objection here is to the stereotypically ‘Western’ fashion element: 
these images unequivocally reject the ‘Western’ ideal of female bodies (wear 
make-up, show your figure and preferably some skin, follow fashion trends, etc.), 
and they guide the viewer in ‘how to do it instead to get it right’. Revealingly, the 
text accompanying Image 2 refers to the modification of the template for the 
prescribed style ‘to a degree’ – pointing directly to the ‘unique’ recognizability 
that should be part of one’s self-articulation, while not being overwhelmed by 
too strong an accent.  
Here we also see how the notion of authenticity is relevant in understanding 
accents: indeed, Entwistle (2000: 121) points to a whole ‘moral universe’ in 
which “dress and appearance are thought to reveal one’s ‘true’ identity”. Here, 
that ‘true’ identity would be that of a religious, modest self projected onto a fully 
‘veiled’ body. However, evoking different centers of recognition – always a 
potential ‘risk’ in articulating one’s accent – becomes a problem here, as too 
strong a fashion-conscious (‘Western’?) accent potentially overrides the ‘true’ 
self that is supposed to be visible in the articulation of one’s identity. Crossing 
the boundaries of expected authenticity is possible and tolerated, but the limits 
of that are strictly policed. 
As we shall see next, details are indeed of essence in the successful articulations 
of (hijabista) identities 
The pink marshmallow look, the hipster hijab and other accents 
In today’s global supermarket of identities, the internet is full of instructions on 
how to attain certain accents, and the fracturing of identities is visible in the 
immense range of items and commodities that are made to seem important in 
one’s articulation. As noted earlier, constructing oneself revolves around 
arranging an ordered cluster of details; permutations of such clusters enable a 
virtually endless range of ‘small’ identities to be produced. 
We can view the ‘how to’ discourse, here in the case of the hijabista, as a 
continuum, where at one end of ‘how to’ hijab, we find basic, generic 
instructions. Hijabista videos on YouTube feature this whole range. For instance 
the video “How to wear hijab’11 gives a detailed description on how to wear the 
headscarf, specifying four different types of instruction: how to wear a square 
hijab, an oblong Shayla, a one-piece Shayla, and a Al-Amira hijab. This is quite 
general, as we find out when we start examining the ways in which the hijabista 
can be accessorised to achieve certain stylised identities. Getting more specific, 
we find, for instance, the following: ‘Criss Cross hijab style/tutorial’12; ‘Hijab 
Tutorial Style for Work/High School/College – A Requested Look’13; ‘Hijab Style 





Tutorial Using Lace Headband and a Butterfly Brooch’14 (with the caption 
pointing out that ‘The lace headbands and butterfly brooch are all from H&M’); 
‘Hijab style/tutorial – The Pink Marshmallow Look’15; ‘Hijab/Hijaab Tutorial 
Style-Two Arabian Princess Looks’16; ‘Hijab tutorial: how to wear a 
headscarf/hijab modern style with a flower.wmv’17; ‘Hijab tutorial for 
glasses/sunglasses’18; ‘StyleCovered- hijab tutorial pashmina with accessories’19; 
‘Pleated caterpillar style Hijab Tutorial By Ruby Ahmed’20;  ‘The Roley Poley 
Style Hijab Tutorial’21; ‘Hijab Tutorial: Funky Layered Look (Requested)’22; 
‘Everyday Hijab Style/Hoodie Hijab Tutorial’23  – and so on, and so on, ad 
infinitum.  
Being a hijabista is thus by no means a single, uniform thing, and the ‘how to’ 
discourse illustrates the infinite possibilities provided by stylisation through the 
consumption and display of different commodities to suit certain occasions 
(‘everyday’; ‘work/high school/college’) and to produce certain accents 
(‘Arabian Princess’; ‘The Pink Marshmallow’). The details and artefacts used give 
one one’s accent, and open up whole universes of meaning, pointing to certain 
identities and lifestyles. Hence also – given that keeping up with fashion trends 
requires the spending of sometimes great amounts of money – we now see that 
the phenomenon of ‘frugal fashionistas’ has appeared (e.g. ‘The Frugal 
Fatshionista’24). As described in the Hijab Savvy blog, “I’m really excited to be 
sharing this new series with all of you! The Frugal Hijabista is for the woman 
who enjoys – yes I said actually enjoys saving money and finding a bargain.”25. 
Being frugal is, in fact, about enjoying being frugal, i.e. not something dictated by 
economic necessity, but a lifestyle actively chosen. Another such example is the 








21 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hs9sTBANRgs; “Well it’s the turban style 
of wearing the hijab but more bulky and more loose. Works well with the crinkly 




25 http://hijabsavvy.com/category/frugal-hijabista/, emphasis original 
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eco-hijab style which “fuses Muslims’ ‘green’ values with with [sic] their visual 
identity of modest clothing, for example organic hijabs made from bamboo.”26  
All these styles call for the acquisition and display of certain commodities, and 
the infinite fracturing into different styles such as ‘romantic, girly look’, ‘the 
urban chic style’27 etc. is also visible in the images below, as certain consumer 
items and the particular way in which they are worn evoke specific identity 




Image 4. Hipster style http://hotchicksinhijabs.com/ 
 
And the gothic hijabista from Finland: 
                                                        
26 http://www.greenprophet.com/2011/01/eco-hijabs-on-rise/ 




Image 5. Gothic style http://vaatekaappi.vuodatus.net/  
 
As we have seen above, accents are (sometimes very heavily) accessorised, and it 
is clear that the accessories that contribute to the creation of a hipster accent 
would not work in the making of the gothic one, and vice versa. For the hijabista, 






Image 6. http://pinzpinzpinz.co.uk/  
Just by looking at the list, we can conjure up images of different hijabistas: 
snowflakes, Swarovski crystal pins, hearts and Blinging Pinz all evoke different 
accents. All of these details provide alternative alignments with recognizable 
styles in public. And such details must be brought ‘in order’, so to speak, by 
means of a micropolitics of the self: a delicately organized collection of 
nonrandom forms of behavior producing that specific ‘self’. We shall have a look 
at a video that presents all the detailed practices of arrangement needed for a 
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certain kind of style, for a certain kind of occasion – requiring a certain kind of 
accent. 
The video is titled “OOTD #1 Date Night!”28, OOTD referring to ‘Outfit of the Day’. 
The young woman presenting the outfit is “going out with family and a dinner 
out with her ‘hubby’” – hence a specific ‘date night’ outfit, naturally composed of 
specific details and consumer items. She starts the video by introducing her head 




Image 7. The constituent parts of the hijab 
This is followed by a detailed explanation on what else she is wearing, starting 
with the top – a ‘babydoll turtleneck’ (Images 8 and 9).  




Image 8. The hijab worn with a babydoll turtleneck 
 
 
Image 9. The babydoll turtleneck 
She then points to the accessories she is wearing – earrings and a ring (Images 
10 and 11) 
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Image 10. Accessories: earrings  
 
 
Image 11. Accessories: a ring 
The choice of these particular accessories is by no means random, as illustrated 
by Image 12.  
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Image 12. Keeping it simple with the accessories  
Here, the focus on the accessories and ‘keeping it simple’ with them, because “I 
have kind of a lot of stuff going on up here. So everything else is simple and I’m 
wearing blue jeans.” The specific head cover worn, then, dictates the accessories 
worn. The blue jeans already mentioned are also qualified not simply as ‘blue 





Image 13. Blue jeans (“just boot cut so not too tight”) 
Neither does the babydoll turtleneck pass without further elaboration (Image 
14):  
 
Image 14. “Baby doll turtle neck comes up to my knees” 






Image 15. Medium-size scrunchie for volume 
And we end by zooming into the ‘medium-size’ head wear that is there ‘for 
volume’ (Image 16): 
 
Image 16. Zooming in on the (medium) volume 
Importantly, we also get to know how to acquire (some of) these items to be able 




Image 17. Where you can buy the pieces of clothing shown on the video (caption 
to the video) 
 
Having watched this video, we now know how to create a ‘date night outfit’ that 
is ‘hijabista’. On the surface this does not seem like too complicated a creation, 
but as we learn throughout the video, there are details one is supposed to pay 
attention to (the blue jeans are ‘not too tight’; the head cover is ‘medium’; the 
accessories worn should be few). Getting it right requires the acquisition of 
certain consumer commodities that are then ordered in a particular way for a 
particular effect – and in this as in many other cases online, these items are 
conveniently made purchasable by just a click of the mouse – one’s specific and 
desired identity is only a link away. Implied in all of this is of course meticulous 
care of one’s self and attention to detail such as what specific amount of 
accessories will be successful with a particular head scarf. In ‘how to’, knowing 
what is too much and what is too little is crucial.  
Conclusion 
Although the demands of recognizability and the identity templates of consumer 
culture keep our accents in check, in a superdiverse world of global flows, 
articulations and identities become less and less predictable. The ‘super-
semiotics’ of the internet provide for the easy creation and fast publication of 
potentially infinite creation of accents – and infinitely fractured range and scope 
of ‘how to’. 
While the emphasis on hardly noticeable details is by no means restricted to the 
Hijabistas – we see it rather as a constant element in the micropolitics of identity, 
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see Blommaert & Varis (2012) – it surely helps Hijabistas to maneuver the field 
of conflict and contestation in which their practices are set. As noted earlier, the 
hijab is the object of heated debates, and while the Hijabistas clearly violate the 
demarcation of ‘hijab versus not hijab’ imposed from within certain branches of 




Blommaert, Jan & Piia Varis 2011. Enough is enough: The heuristics of 
authenticity in superdiversity. Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies Paper 2.  
http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-
groups/babylon/tpcs/ 
Blommaert, Jan & Piia Varis 2012. Culture as accent. Tilburg Papers in Culture 
Studies, Paper 18. http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-
research-groups/babylon/tpcs/  
Brenner, Suzanne 1996. Reconstructing self and society: Javanese Muslim 
women and “the veil”. American Ethnologist 23 (4), 673-697. 
Entwistle, Joanne 2000. The fashioned body. Fashion, dress and modern social 
theory. Cambridge: Polity. 
Fadil, Nadia 2011. Not - / unveiling as an ethical practice. Feminist Review 98, 83-
109. 
Foucault 1988. 
Hall, Stuart 1986. On postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart 
Hall. Journal of Communication Inquiry 10, 45-60. 
Jones, Carla 2007. Fashion and faith in urban Indonesia. Fashion Theory 11 (2-3), 
211-232. 
Rimke, Heidi Marie 2000. Governing citizens through self-help literature. 
Cultural Studies 14 (1), 61-78. 
Rose, Nikolas 1999 (1989). Governing the soul. The shaping of the private self. 2nd 
edition. London: Free Association Books. 
 49 
Chapter 4: 
Life Projects and light communities 
 
In line with the discussions in the previous chapters, , we will attempt to sketch 
in what follows a realistic and empirically sustainable research program, 
focusing on the actual patterns of behavior that people display as bases, or 
indexicals, for defining identities, avoiding a priori categorizations and rejecting 
the exclusivity of explicitly identitarian metadiscourses as a research object in 
the study of identities. What people explicitly tell about identity is too often a 
very poor indicator of, and stands in an awkward relationship with, their actual 
identity articulating practices. Instead, we shall focus on observable behavior in 
connection to what we can call a micropolitics of identity – the presence and 
function of ‘ordering scripts’ in which various micro-practical features are 
brought into line with each other, and together, as an orderly ‘package’, create 
recognizable meanings.  
In what follows, we will describe such practices and the orderly way in which 
they occur as “life projects”. Adding to this, we will then suggest to view the 
specific kinds of ‘groupness’ that emerge from such practices as “focused but 
diverse”. Both notions will be introduced here in their most sketchy forms and 
without much reference to existing literature – the attempt here is to incite 
discussion and hypothesis testing through research, and even blunt and 
unfinished notional or analytic tools can be helpful in this process. 
Life Projects 
In earlier chapters, we emphasized (a) that contemporary identity work revolves 
strongly around consumption, as predicted half a century ago by Marcuse (1964); 
(b) that identity work, oriented towards ‘authenticity’, appears to involved 
complex ‘dosings’ of emblematic features; (c) within a rather narrow bandwidth 
of difference. Marcuse argued that identities are dislodged from the ‘grand 
politics’ of submission to or revolt against the political and economic system. 
Identities defined by orientations to specific commodities are thus depoliticized 
identities, identities that refer only to themselves and not to larger power 
structures.  
Our earlier chapters responded, we think, to this line of argument in three ways: 
(a) the ‘grand politics’ has not truly left the orbit of identity, but has been 
replaced by a micropolitics of “care of the self” that connects it in different ways 
to larger-scale political relations and social structures (Foucault 2007); and (b) 
this means that rather than depoliticization, we observe intense forms of 
repoliticization, oriented towards multiple, often ephemeral and temporary, but 
nonetheless compelling patterns of order, now dispersed over a vast terrain of 
everyday behaviors; (c) leading to limited forms of agency within a general 
structure of submission, perhaps aptly captured by the notion of “prosumer”: 
while submitting to the orders of consumption, people do produce something 
new, specific and unique – “culture as accent”. These three points are the takeoff 
position for what follows. 
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Let us consider two ordinary examples of contemporary advertisement, both 
referring to automobiles. Figure 1, a Mercedes Benz ad, projects the purchase of 
a car onto “a belief”. Note that in the ad, the car itself is not visible: we just see 
the iconic sign of the brand; what dominates the ad is the statement that buying 
a Mercedes Benz – any Mercedes Benz – is more than the purchase of a useful 
object: it is the purchase of a mythologized object (in the sense of Barthes 1957), 
an overdetermined object that bespeaks a vision, a set of ideals, a particular 
attitude in life. Purchasing a Mercedes Benz means buying an identity, and when 
you drive this vehicle, you express that identity (or so it is suggested). 
BMW takes another route in Figure 2. Here, the object – the car – is connected to 
the role of a father and his relationship with his children. The connection with 
(gendered!) identity is explicit here: “How do you become ‘best daddy in the 
world’?” The answer: by buying a BMW. You will “impress his friends” and make 
your child so happy. 
 
 





Figure 2: BMW advertisement. 
 
We have grown accustomed to such forms of advertisement in which the 
commodity is loaded, so to speak, with intricate sets of personality features, and 
in which the purchase of that commodity, thus, becomes a way of buying those 
features of personality that are contained, as a crucial and defining 
characteristic, in the commodity. One, thus, buys an indexical, and such acts of 
consumption are always, and instantly, acts of identity. This is the reason why 
the commodity itself does not need to be displayed in ads: its not so much the 
commodity we desire, it is the identity indexical that comes with the commodity. 
We buy the “adjectives”, to paraphrase Barthes.  
We have also seen in Figure 1 that we do not necessarily need to purchase a 
specific object: buying a brand is sufficient. The “adjectives” – the identity 
indexicals – are attached to brands, more than to specific objects. Figure 3 shows 
an example of how one can literally become the brand. The young woman 
depicted in it is said to be “librarian by day, Bacardi by night”. 
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Figure 3: Bacardi ad. 
The point here is to observe how commodities are linearly connected to identity 
features. Buying an object, preferably one with a recognizable brand, enables one 
to “become the brand”, i.e. to approach the identity archetypes indexically lodged 
in the brand. Young women drinking Bacardi, thus, can come closer to the 
attractive party girl suggested in Figure 3; a man buying a BMW can come closer 
to the ideal of “the best daddy in the world”.  
Objects and brands, thus, propose elements of stories of the self to their 
prospective customers. And so, whenever we buy something, we can provide an 
account or rationalization of this particular purchase with respect to who we are. I 
can explain my preference for a BMW to others by arguing that I am a family 
man; I can explain my predilection for Bacardi by arguing that I am not just a 
(rather stuffy) librarian during the day but also a party girl at night. 
Consumption, thus, becomes an essential ingredient in an escalating culture of 
accountability (escalating notably due to the use of social media) in which every 
aspect of our being and our lives can be questioned by others, and needs to be 
motivated, explained, rationalized. I buy an Apple computer, and I am supposed 
to explain this specific purchase by referring it to aspects of my personality. 
Answering “well, I just needed a PC” or “oh, I never thought of it” are 
dispreferred responses to questions about the reasons why we bought that 
specific PC. We are expected to be knowledgeable in the hugely complex field of 
specific indexicalities attached to specific brands and products, and we are 
expected to be competent in constructing such indexical accounts about the 
details of our consumption behavior. Consumption has been broken down into a 
cosmos of infinitesimally small meaningful chunks in which specific products 
project specific bits of identity. Bourdieu’s (1984) distinction appears to have 
achieved extreme forms of specialization. 
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Consumption, of course, is not a homogeneous field; buying a BMW is an activity 
that occurs in another zone of life than buying a Bacardi cocktail in a club, 
organic vegetables for dinner or a specific shower gel for everyday use. We made 
this point in earlier papers: specific zones of life and being are subject to specific 
microhegemonies. For every zone, we have the choice between a variety of 
‘scripts’ that bring order to the potentially chaotic field of consumption-and-
identity. Getting ready for work in the morning involves handling a dozen or 
more commodities, from the shower gel and toothpaste we use in the bathroom, 
over the dress, shoes, make-up and perfume we wear, to the organic breakfast 
cereals we eat and the low-fat milk we pour into our cup of fair trade coffee.  
If we would see such stages of a day in terms of ‘ideological’ coherence – a 
symphony of dozens of indexicals all collapsing nicely into a coherent ‘me’ – we 
would find a cacophonic and internally contradictory complex. While my 
preference for organic cereals and fair trade coffee might bespeak an ‘ecological’ 
orientation, the skin lotion I use might be tested on animals, the low-fat milk can 
be produced in fully industrialized conditions, and the shower gel can contain 
seriously polluting phosphates. The thing is that every separate item in this 
complex has its own ‘logic’, so to speak, and that we do not perceive the bundling 
of a range of different items into a complex activity such as getting ready for 
work as one complex, but rather as a sequence of separate orientations to 
specific commodities, each of which provides a reasonably plausible account of 
‘me’.  
This does not preclude adherence to larger ‘scripts’ that organize bundles of such 
features. The cacophonic complex of features can still be shot through by 
arrangements that combine a multitude of details into more elaborate identity 
scripts or genres, that allow a measure of deviance while displaying instant 
‘total’ recognizability. Figure 4 (an image already encountered in the previous 
chapter) might illustrate this; it is an image we found when entering “managers” 
into Google Images. 
 
Figure 4: “managers” 
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The gentlemen in the picture are both cleanly shaven, attractive, and wear a dark 
suit and necktie; the ladies are young, attractive, dressed in white shirts and 
(with one exception) dark jackets and have their hair either loose or tied into a 
knot. They drink water or soft drinks; all of them carry writing equipment. We do 
not see piercings or visible tattoos, no unshaven male chins, no uncombed hair, 
no silly coffee mugs. What we see here is the recognizability of a collection, or 
collocation of features, that makes a reading of ‘managers’ more plausible than, 
say, ‘a group of philosophers discussing Schopenhauer’.  The microhegemonies 
attached to specific objects and features can also be grouped into genres, and 
knowledgeability of individual indexicals needs to be accompanied by 
knowledgeability of such bundles of features. 
This is where the notion of ‘life projects’ enters the picture. Our everyday lives, 
thus observed, become complex projects in which almost every aspect, from the 
very big to the very small, requires elaborate forms of accounting and 
explanation to others, and requires elaborate ‘ordering’ work in attempts to “be 
ourselves” – more precisely, in attempts to be recognized  as the specific person I 
try to offer for ratification by others. “Project” here retains its intrinsic semantic 
ambivalence: we turn our existence into a project that demands perpetual work, 
elaboration, adjustment, change, transformation; and we do that by means of 
indexical ‘projections’ in which possession and display of a feature – my shoes, 
my car – triggers recognizable identity features. I arrive in my BMW at work, 
which makes me a “BMW guy”. I take my iPad from the car, which makes me an 
“Apple guy”. I walk in wearing my Boss suit, which makes me a “Boss guy”, and 
the receptionist is exposed to my Davidoff after-shave fragrance, which makes 
me a “Davidoff guy”, and so forth. At any moment of our everyday existence, thus, 
we are readable patchworks of recognizable micro-signs, each of which can be 
picked up by others and converted into identity projections. 
Life projects are highly dynamic and subject to substantial, and rapid, change. 
The readable patchwork we were at the age of 17 differs tremendously from the 
one we became at the age of 30. Changes in fashion, general preference, or 
technological standards trigger vast and pervasive changes in the way we 
consume and, thus, can or have to “be ourselves”. We repeat that “being 
ourselves” – widely believed to be something that we construct autonomously, 
with almost unlimited agentivity – is very much a matter of uptake and 
ratification by others. We can only “be ourselves” if and when others recognize 
and understand us as such. And evidently, this process is not restricted to what 
we would identify as the mainstream of society; it is as pervasive and as 
compelling in subcultures and in what Howard Becker (1963) a long time ago 
described as communities of “outsiders”. 
Light communities 
The groups that emerge out of the complex patterns of life projects described 
above are best seen as focused but diverse occasioned coagulations of people. 
People converge or coagulate around a shared focus – an object, a shared 
interest, another person, an event. This focusing is occasioned in the sense that it 
is triggered by a specific prompt, bound in time and space (even in ‘virtual’ 
space), and thus not necessarily ‘eternal’ in nature. This is why such forms of 
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coagulation should not be seen as creating uniformity or homogeneity: the 
people thus coagulating around a shared focus remain as diverse as before and 
after, in the sense that their identities remain as complex and multi-readable as 
before and after. Such coagulations, recall, were dismissed by Goffman as not 
being true “social groups” (Goffman 1961: 8-13), because Goffman restricted the 
notion of “social group” to formations that bore the traditional characteristics of 
“thick” communities in the Durkheimian tradition. 
But let us examine the matter in some detail. Take a group of people watching a 
football game in a pub. In all likelihood, while some of these people may know 
each other we cannot assume any degree of ‘deep’ affinity among those people. 
They converge on a shared focus, the game, which is a specific and unique 
occasion, but is also part of a genre of such occasions – football games broadcast 
in a pub. We see an amazingly robust group. During the game, these people will 
share an enormous degree of similarity in behavior, will experience a sense of 
almost intimate closeness and a vast amount of cognitive and emotional 
sharedness. A goal will provoke mass cheering, a missed chance provokes 
general distress and shouts of disappointment. Since they are in a pub, most if 
not all of them will consume drinks – while few, if any of them will order a meal 
during the game. And as soon as the game is over, the robust group will dissipate 
in no time. Several smaller groups will form, people will leave, and the patterns 
of behavior and interaction dominantly displayed during the game will vanish 
and be replaced by entirely different ones. The diversity that characterized the 
group, even while displaying tremendous uniformity during the event – re-
emerges as soon as the moment of focusing is over. We see here what Goffman 
observed as “an extremely full array of interaction processes” (1961: 11); but 
contrary to what Goffman suggested with respect to e.g. poker players, the 
participants in such focused practices do display, enact and embody a strong 
sense of group membership – one not replacing their traditional “thick” identities 
such as nationality, gender, social class, ethnicity and so forth, but a sense of 
group membership that might complement or, in some circumstances, even 
accentuate and intensify the “thick” community identities (as when one’s national 
team is at work). Such identities are part of identity repertoires and can be 
invoked in complex interactions with other elements from the repertoire, in 
which the specific “package” would be the identity presented to others for 
appraisal.  
So let us not too quickly dismiss such groups as unimportant. We spend very 
important parts of our lives in such ephemeral forms of groupness. When our 
morning train is late again, we find ourselves in conversations with other 
strangers on the platform, voicing amazingly similar complaints; the moment the 
train pulls in, these interactions cease and we return to habituated patterns of 
behavior – minding one’s own business on a train. A traffic accident or another 
calamity likewise provokes coagulations of highly diverse people into 
tremendously uniform groups. And while the ‘managers’ in Figure 4 appear like a 
very solid group in this picture of a “meeting”, nothing will prevent the 
participants from drifting off into entirely different directions as soon as the 
meeting finishes. The common features that enabled the closeness of groupness 
during the moment of focusing do not neutralize the many other, diverse 
features that each participant displays and can enact, and as soon as the joint 
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focus is lifted, each participant can return to an entirely different set of 
alignments based on entirely different features. Imagine, just for fun, that when 
the managers in Figure 4 end their meeting and walk off, the young man in the 
picture asks the blonde woman whether she would be interested in going to a 
Dire Straits concert together – he can get tickets; an entirely new set of features 
would become the stuff for coagulation at that point. And if they get to that 
concert, entirely different features of their identities will enable them to focus on 
the event, and will contribute to, again, a colossal robustness as a group. They 
will cheer simultaneously with thousands of other people, and they will even 
sing “Sultans of Swing” along with, and in precisely the same beat as thousands 
of people otherwise entirely unknown to them. All of these features were already 
present around the meeting table in Figure 4. 
Contrary to Goffman, thus, we see no reason why we should consider such 
focused-but-diverse groups to be fundamentally different from (or for that 
matter, inferior to) “thick” (Durkheimian) communities such as, for instance, 
“nations”, “ethnicities”, “religious communities” or what not. In the kind of 
empirical heuristics we try to develop here, focusing around such ‘big’ and ‘thick’ 
identity elements is not necessarily more frequently or more intensely done than 
focusing around mundane events (such as train delays or a Dire Straits concert). 
We are not saying that features such as nationality or ethnicity are absent when 
people start chatting on a railway platform; we say, however, that they do not 
provide the triggers for focusing as a group at that moment, and that it is good to 
take that empirical point de repère seriously in our analyses of contemporary 
identities. Other features of identity can become relevant in the eyes of 
bystanders or after the fact – imagine two young people falling in love with each 
other and starting a relationship, which turns out to be solid gossip material for 
others because both are active politicians attached to parties that are otherwise 
each other’s ideological adversaries. As we emphasized, the diversity 
characterizing the group does not disappear during moments of intense 
focusing; it remains a potential for multiple readings and interpretations that can 
be exploited at any point by anyone who can recognize the relevant features. 
Refocusing by others – here is the crucial aspect of uptake and ratification again 
– is also perpetually possible. 
If we now briefly return to the consumption culture we used as our point of 
departure here, we see how multiple “light” groups are continuously formed 
around shared aspects of individual life projects. All BMW drivers, in spite of 
enormous and fundamental differences between them, share a potential focus 
with each other: the brand of their cars. If they do not do this focusing 
themselves, others can (“oh hell, there’s another arrogant BMW driver!!”). People 
sharing a preference for particular brands can find each other, even during very 
short moments, in very focused “brand fan” groups on social media. The “like” 
button on Facebook is that medium’s sublime instrument for brief moments of 
focusing, in which people otherwise unrelated or unconnected can find 
themselves liking, at the same time and in the same space, the latest iPhone type 
or the new album of Shakira for instance. 
It is not likely that we will understand, and be able to realistically generalize, 
contemporary “identity” unless we take into account these complex, ephemeral, 
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layered, dynamic and unstable patterns of identity construction, identity 
ratification and group formation. Even more: we risk not understanding it at all 
when we fail to address patterns of identity processes that dominate enormous 
segments of our lives and are, empirically, clearly objects of intense concern for 
enormous numbers of people, who invest amazing amounts of resources and 
energy into them. Social and cultural phenomena should not be too quickly 
dismissed as irrelevant because they do not appear on our theoretical and 
analytical radars at present; if they occur and prove to be of significance in the 
social and cultural life of people, we at least need to examine them critically. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conviviality and collectives on social media: 
Virality, memes and new social structures 
 
Introduction 
In a very insightful and relatively early paper on the phenomenon, Vincent Miller 
(2008) questions the ‘content’ of communication on social media and microblogs 
(Facebook and Twitter, respectively), and concludes: 
“We are seeing how in many ways the internet has become as much about 
interaction with others as it has about accessing information. (…) In the 
drift from blogging, to social networking, to microblogging we see a shift 
from dialogue and communication between actors in a network, where 
the point of the network was to facilitate an exchange of substantive 
content, to a situation where the maintenance of a network itself has 
become the primary focus. (…) This has resulted in a rise of what I have 
called ‘phatic media’ in which communication without content has taken 
precedence.” (Miller 2008: 398) 
Miller sees the avalanche of ‘empty’ messages on new social media as an 
illustration of the ‘postsocial’ society in which networks rather than (traditional, 
organic) communities are the central fora for establishing social ties between 
people. The messages are ‘empty’ in the sense that no perceptibly ‘relevant 
content’ is being communicated; thus, such messages are typologically germane 
to the kind of ‘small talk’ which Bronislaw Malinowski (1923 (1936)) identified 
as ‘phatic communion’ and described as follows: 
“’phatic communion’ serves to establish bonds of personal union between 
people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not 
serve any purpose of communicating ideas.” (Malinowski 1923 (1936): 
316) 
For Malinowski, phatic communion was a key argument for his view that 
language should not just be seen as a carrier of propositional contents 
(“communicating ideas” in the fragment above), but as a mode of social action the 
scope of which should not be reduced to ‘meaning’ in the denotational sense of 
the term. In an excellent paper on the history of the term ‘phatic communion’, 
Gunter Senft notes the post-hoc reinterpretation of the term by Jakobson (1960) 
as ‘channel-oriented’ interaction, and describes phatic communion as  
“utterances that are said to have exclusively social, bonding functions like 
establishing and maintaining a friendly and harmonious atmosphere in 
interpersonal relations, especially during the opening and closing stages 
of social – verbal – encounters. These utterances are understood as a 
means for keeping the communication channels open.” (Senft 1995: 3) 
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Senft also emphasizes the difference between ‘communion’ and ‘communication’. 
Malinowski never used the term phatic ‘communication’, and for a reason: 
‘communion’ stresses (a) the ritual aspects of phatic phenomena, and (b) the fact 
that through phatic communion, people express their sense of ‘union’ with a 
community. We will come back to this later on.  
When it came to explaining the phenomenon, Malinowski saw the fear of silence, 
understood as an embarrassing situation in interaction among Trobriand 
Islanders, as the motive underlying the frequency of phatic communion. In order 
not to appear grumpy or taciturn to the interlocutor, Trobrianders engaged in 
sometimes lengthy exchanges of ‘irrelevant’ talk. While Malinowski saw this 
horror vacui as possibly universal, Dell Hymes cautioned against such an 
interpretation and suggested that “the distribution of required and preferred 
silence, indeed, perhaps most immediately reveals in outline form a community’s 
structure of speaking” (Hymes 1972 (1986): 40; see Senft 1995: 4-5 for a 
discussion). There are indeed communities where, unless one has anything 
substantial to say, silence is strongly preferred over small talk and ‘phatic 
communion’ would consequently be experienced as an unwelcome violation of 
social custom. This is clearly not the case in the internet communities explored 
by Vincent Miller, where ‘small’ and ‘content-free’ talk appears to be if not the 
rule, then certainly a very well entrenched mode of interaction.  
This, perhaps, compels us to take ‘phatic’ talk seriously, given that it is so hard to 
avoid as a phenomenon in e.g. social media. And this, then, would be a correction 
to a deeply ingrained linguistic and sociolinguistic mindset, in which ‘small talk’ 
– the term itself announces it – is perceived as not really important and not really 
in need of much in-depth exploration.  
Schegloff’s (1972; Schegloff & Sacks 1973) early papers on conversational 
openings and closings described these often routinized sequences as a 
mechanism in which speaker and hearer roles were established and confirmed. 
This early interpretation shows affinity with Malinowski’s ‘phatic communion’ – 
the concern with the ‘channel’ of communication – as well as with Erving 
Goffman’s (1967) concept of ‘interaction ritual’ in which people follow 
particular, relatively perduring templates that safeguard ‘order’ in face-to-face 
interaction. In an influential later paper, however, Schegloff (1988) rejected 
Goffman’s attention to ‘ritual’ and ‘face’ as instances of ‘psychology’ (in fact, as 
too much interested in the meaning of interaction), and reduced the Goffmanian 
rituals to a more ‘secularized’ study of interaction as a formal ‘syntax’ in which 
human intentions and subjectivities did not matter too much. The question of 
what people seek to achieve by means of ‘small talk’, consequently, led a life on 
the afterburner of academic attention since then – when it occurred it was often 
labelled as ‘mundane’ talk, that is: talk that demands not to be seen as full of 
substance and meaning, but can be analyzed merely as an instance of the 
universal formal mechanisms of human conversation (Briggs 1997 provides a 
powerful critique of this). Evidently, when the formal patterns of phatic 
communion are the sole locus of interest, not much is left to be said on the topic.  
As mentioned, the perceived plenitude of phatic communion on the internet 
pushes us towards attention to such ‘communication without content’. In what 
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follows, we will engage with this topic and focus on a now-current internet 
phenomenon: memes. Memes will be introduced in the next section, and we shall 
focus on (a) the notion of ‘viral spread’ in relation to agentivity and 
consciousness, and (b) the ways in which we can see ‘memes’, along with 
perhaps many of the phenomena described by Miller, as forms of conviviality. In 
a concluding section, we will identify some perhaps important implications of 
this view. 
Going viral 
On January 21, 2012 Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg posted an update on his 
Facebook timeline, introduced by “Here’s some interesting weekend reading” 
(Figure 1). The message itself was 161 words long, and it led to a link to a 2000-
word article. Within 55 seconds of being posted, the update got 932 “likes” and 
was “shared” 30 times by other Facebook users. After two minutes, the update 
had accumulated 3,101 “likes” and 232 “shares”. 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of Zuckerberg’s status update on Facebook, January 2012. 
 
Given the structure and size of the text sent around by Zuckerberg, it is quite 
implausible that within the first two minutes or so, more than 3,000 people had 
already read Zuckerberg’s update and the article which it provides a link to, 
deliberated on its contents and judged it ‘likeable’, and the same goes for the 
more than 200 times that the post had already been shared on other users’ 
timelines. So what is happening here? 
Some of the uptake can probably be explained with ‘firsting’, i.e. the 
preoccupation to be the first to comment on or like an update on social media – 
most clearly visible in the form of comments simply stating “first!”. Another 
major explanation could be ‘astroturfing’: it is plausible that many of those who 
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“like” and “share” Zuckerberg’s update are in fact Facebook employees 
deliberately attempting to increase its visibility. We can guess, but we simply do 
not know. What we do know for sure, however, is that as a consequence of a first 
level of uptake – people liking and sharing the post – there are further and 
further levels of uptake, as other users witness this liking and sharing activity 
(some of it may already be showing in the figures here), and consequently make 
inferences about the meaning of the post itself, but also about the person(s) in 
their network who reacted to it. Further layers of contextualisation are thus 
added to the original post which may have an influence on the uptake by others. 
Different social media platforms offer similar activity types: YouTube users can 
“view” videos and “like” them, as well as adding “comments” to them and adding 
videos to a profile list of preferences; Twitter users can create “hashtags” (a form 
of metadata-based “findability” of text, Zappavigna 2011: 792) and “retweet” 
tweets from within their network; similar operations are possible on Instagram 
as well as on most local or regional social media platforms available throughout 
the world. Each time, we see that specific activities are made available for the 
rapid “viral” spread of particular signs, while the actual content or formal 
properties of those signs do not seem to prevail as criteria for sharing, at least 
not when these properties are understood as denotational-semantic or aesthetic 
in the Kantian sense. We shall elaborate this below. The ace of virality after the 
first decade of the 21st century is undoubtedly the South-Korean music video 
called Gangnam Style, performed by an artist called Psy: Gangnam Style was 
posted on YouTube on 15 July, 2012, and had been viewed 2,065552172 times 
on 18 August 2014. Competent as well as lay observers appear to agree that the 
phenomenal virality of Gangnam Style was not due to the intrinsic qualities, 
musical, choreographic or otherwise, of the video. The hype was driven by 
entirely different forces. 
The point to all of this however, is that we see a communicative phenomenon of 
astonishing speed and scope: large numbers of people react on a message by 
expressing their “liking” and by judging it relevant enough to “share” it with huge 
numbers of “friends” within their social media community. At the same time, in 
spite of Zuckerberg’s message being textual, it was not read in the common sense 
understanding of this term. The “like” and “share” reactions, consequently, refer 
to another kind of decoding and understanding than the ones we conventionally 
use in text and discourse analysis – “meaning” as an outcome of denotational-
textual decoding is not at stake here, and so the “liking” and “sharing” is best 
seen as “phatic” in the terms discussed above. Yet, these phatic activities appear 
to have extraordinary importance for those who perform them, as “firsting” and 
“astroturfing” practices illustrate: people on social media find it very important 
to be involved in “virality”. People find it important to be part of a group that 
“likes” and “shares” items posted by others. It is impossible to know – certainly 
in the case of Zuckerberg – who the members of this group effectively are (this is 
the problem of scope, and we shall return to it), but this ignorance of identities of 
group members does seem to matter less than the expression of membership by 
means of phatic “likes” and “shares”. What happens here is “communion” in the 
sense of Malinowski: identity statements expressing, pragmatically and 
metapragmatically, membership of some group. Such groups are not held 
together by high levels of awareness and knowledge of deeply shared values and 
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functions – the classical community of Parsonian sociology – but by loose bonds 
of shared, even if superficial interest or “ambient affiliation” in Zappavigna’s 
terms (2011: 801), enabled by technological features of social media affording 
forms of searchability and findability of “like”-minded people. 
We need to be more specific though, and return to our Facebook example. 
“Liking” is an identity statement directly oriented towards the author of the 
update – Zuckerberg – and indirectly inscribing oneself into the community of 
those who “like” Zuckerberg, as well as indirectly flagging something to one’s 
own community of Facebook “friends” (who can monitor activities performed 
within the community). Patricia Lange, thus, qualifies such responsive uptake 
activities (“viewing” YouTube videos in her case) as forms of “self-
interpellation”: people express a judgment that they themselves belong to the 
intended audiences of a message or sign (2009: 71). “Sharing”, by contrast, 
recontextualizes and directly reorients this statement towards one’s own 
community, triggering another phase in a process of viral circulation, part of 
which can – but must not – involve real “reading” of the text. Also, “liking” is a 
responsive uptake to someone else’s activity while “sharing” is the initiation of 
another activity directed at another (segment of a) community. So, while both 
activities share important dimensions of phaticity with each other, important 
differences also occur. These distinctions, as noted, do not affect the fundamental 
nature of the interaction between actors and signs – “sharing”, as we have seen, 
does not presuppose careful reading of the text – but there are differences in 
agency and activity type.  
This is important to note, because existing definitions of virality would 
emphasize the absence of significant change in the circulation of the sign. Limor 
Shifman (2011: 190), for instance, emphasizes the absence of significant change 
to the sign itself to distinguish virality from “memicity”: memes, as opposed to 
viral signs, would involve changes to the sign itself. We shall see in a moment 
that this distinction is only valid when one focuses on a superficial inspection of 
the formal properties of signs. When one takes social semiotic activities as one’s 
benchmark, however, things become more complicated and more intriguing. We 
have seen that significant distinctions apply to “liking” and “sharing”. In fact, we 
can see both as different genres on a gradient from phatic communion to phatic 
communication: there are differences in agency, in the addressees and 
communities targeted by both activities, and in the fundamental pragmatic and 
metapragmatic features of both activities.  
To clarify the latter: “sharing” an update on Facebook is a classic case of “re-
entextualization” (Bauman & Briggs 1990; Silverstein & Urban 1996) or “re-
semiotization” (Scollon & Scollon 2004). Re-entextualization refers to the 
process by means of which a piece of “text” (a broadly defined semiotic object 
here) is extracted from its original context-of-use and re-inserted into an entirely 
different one, involving different participation frameworks, a different kind of 
textuality – an entire text can be condensed into a quote, for instance – and 
ultimately also very different meaning outcomes – what is marginal in the source 
text can become important in the re-entextualized version, for instance. Re-
semiotization, in line with the foregoing, refers to the process by means of which 
every “repetition” of a sign involves an entirely new set of contextualization 
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conditions and thus results in an entirely “new” semiotic process, allowing new 
semiotic modes and resources to be involved in the repetition process 
(Leppänen et al. 2014). The specific affordances for responsive and sharing 
activities offered by social media platforms are thus not unified or homogeneous: 
we can distinguish a gradient from purely responsive uptake to active and 
redirected re-entextualization and resemiotization, blurring the distinction made 
by Shifman between virality and memicity.  
Let us have a closer look at memes now, and focus again on the different genres 
of memic activity we can discern. 
The weird world of memes 
As we have seen, Shifman locates the difference between virality and memicity in 
the degree to which the sign itself is changed in the process of transmission and 
circulation. Memes are signs the formal features of which have been changed by 
users. Shifman draws on Richard Dawkins, author of The Selfish Gene (1976), 
who coined “meme” by analogy with “gene” as “small cultural units of 
transmission (…) which are spread by copying or imitation” (Shifman 2011: 
188). We have already seen, however, that even simple “copying” or “imitation” 
activities such as Facebook “sharing” involve a major shift in activity type called 
re-entextualization. Memes – often multimodal signs in which images and texts 
are combined – would typically enable intense resemiotization as well, in that 
original signs are altered in various ways, generically germane – a kind of 
“substrate” recognizability would be maintained – but situationally adjusted and 
altered so as to produce very different communicative effects. Memes tend to 
have an extraordinary level of semiotic productivity which involves very different 
kinds of semiotic activity – genres, in other words. 
Let us consider Figures 2-3-4 and 5-6-7. In Figure 2 we see the origin of a 
successful meme, a British World War II propaganda poster. 
 
Figure 2: British wartime propaganda poster. 
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A virtually endless range of resemiotized versions of this poster went viral since 
the year 2000; they can be identified as intertextually related by the speech act 
structure of the message (an adhortative “keep calm” or similar statements, 
followed by a subordinate adhortative) and the graphic features of lettering and 
layout (larger fonts for the adhortatives, the use of a coat of arms-like image). 
Variations on the memic theme range from minimal to maximal, but the generic 
template is constant. Figure 3 shows a minimally resemiotized variant in which 
lettering and coat of arms (the royal crown) are kept, while in Figure 5, the royal 
crown has been changed by a beer mug. 
 
Figure 3: Keep calm and call Batman 
 
Figure 4: Keep calm and drink beer. 
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In Figures 2-3-4 we see how one set of affordances – the visual architecture of 
the sign and its speech act format – becomes the intertextual link enabling the 
infinite resemiotizations while retaining the original semiotic pointer: most 
users of variants of the meme would know that the variants derive from the 
same “original” meme. The visual architecture and speech act format of the 
“original”, thus, are the “mobile” elements in memicity here: they provide memic-
intertextual recognizability, while the textual adjustments redirect the meme 
towards more specific audiences and reset it in different frames of meaning and 
use.  
The opposite can also apply, certainly when memes are widely known because of 
textual-stylistic features: the actual ways in which “languaging” is performed 
through fixed expressions and speech characteristics. A particularly successful 
example of such textual-stylistic memicity is so-called “lolspeak”, the particular 
pidginized English originally associated with funny images of cats (“lolcats”), but 
extremely mobile as a memic resource in its own right. Consider Figure 5-6-7. 
Figure 5 documents the origin of this spectacularly successful meme: a picture of 
a cat, to which the caption “I can has cheezburger?” was added, went viral in 
2007 via a website “I can has cheezburger?”. The particular caption phrase went 
viral as well and became tagged to a wide variety of other images – see Figure 6. 
The caption, then, quickly became the basis for a particular pidginized variety of 
written English, which could in turn be deployed in a broad range of contexts 
(see Figure 7). The extraordinary productivity of this meme-turned-language-
variety was demonstrated in 2010, when a team of “lolspeak” authors completed 
a translation of the entire Bible in their self-constructed language variety. The 
Lolcat Bible can now be purchased as a book through Amazon. 
 








Figure 7: I has a dream. 
The different resources that enter into the production of such memes can turn 
out to be memic in themselves; we are far from the “copying and imitating” used 
by Dawkins in his initial definition of memes. People, as we said, are 
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extraordinarily creative in reorganizing, redirecting and applying memic 
resources over a vast range of thematic domains, addressing a vast range of 
audiences while all the same retaining clear and recognizable intertextual links 
to the original memic sources. This fundamental intertextuality allows for 
combined memes, in which features of different established memes are blended 
in a “mashup” meme. Figure 8 shows such a mashup meme: 
 
 
Figure 8: Keep calm and remove the arrow from your knee. 
We see the familiar template of the “Keep calm” meme, to which a recognizable 
reference to another meme is added. The origin of this other meme, “then I took 
an arrow in the knee”, is in itself worthy of reflection, for it shows the essentially 
arbitrary nature of memic success. The phrase was originally uttered by 
characters from a video game “Skyrim” (Figure 9). The phrase is quite often 
repeated throughout the game, but this does not in itself offer an explanation for 
the viral spread of the expression way beyond the community of Skyrim gamers. 
 
Figure 9: Skyrim scene “Then I took an arrow in the knee” 
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The phrase became wildly productive and can now be tagged to an almost 
infinite range of different expressions, each time retaining a tinge of its original 
apologetic character, and appearing in mashups, as we saw in Figure 8. 
What we see in each of these examples is how memes operate via a combination 
of intertextual recognizability and individual creativity – individual users adding 
an “accent” to existing viral memes, in attempts to go viral with their own 
adapted version. The work of resemiotization involved in such processes can be 
complex and demanding. Mashup memes, for instance, involves elaborate 
knowledge of existing memes, an understanding of the affordances and 
limitations for altering the memes, and graphic, semiotic and technological skills 
to post them online. The different forms of resemiotization represent different 
genres of communicative action, ranging from maximally transparent refocusing 
of existing memes to the creation of very different and new memes, less densely 
connected to existing ones. 
Two points need to be made now. First, we do not see such resemiotizations, 
even drastic and radical ones, as being fundamentally different from the “likes” 
and “shares” we discussed in the previous section. We have seen that “likes” and 
“shares” are already different genres characterized by very different activity 
patterns, orientations to addressees and audiences, and degrees of intervention 
in the original signs. The procedures we have reviewed here differ in degree but 
not in substance: they are, like “retweets”, “likes” and “shares”, re-
entextualizations of existing signs, i.e. meaningful communicative operations 
that demand different levels of agency and creativity of the user. Second, and 
related to this, the nature of the original sign itself – its conventionally 
understood “meaning” – appears to be less relevant than the capacity to deploy it 
in largely phatic, relational forms of interaction, again ranging from what 
Malinowski described as “communion” – ritually expressing membership of a 
particular community – to “communication” within the communities we 
described as held together by “ambient affiliation”. “Meaning” in its traditional 
sense needs to give way here to a more general notion of “function”. Memes, just 
like Mark Zuckerberg’s status updates, do not need to be read in order to be seen 
and understood as denotationally and informationally meaningful; their use and 
re-use appear to be governed by the “phatic” and “emblematic” functions often 
seen as of secondary nature in discourse-analytic literature. 
Conviviality on demand 
But what explains the immense density of such phatic forms of practice on social 
media? How do we make sense of the astonishing speed and scope with which 
such phatic forms of communion and communication circulate, creating – like in 
the case of Gangnam Style – perhaps the largest-scale collective communicative 
phenomena in human history? The explanations, we hope to have shown, do not 
necessarily have to be located in the features of the signs themselves, nor in the 
specific practices they prompt – both are unspectacular. So perhaps the 
explanations must be sought in the social world in which these phatic practices 
make sense. 
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In a seminal paper, Alice Marwick and danah boyd (2010: 120) distinguish 
between email and Twitter. They have this to say on the topic: 
“(…) the difference between Twitter and email is that the latter is 
primarily a directed technology with people pushing content to persons 
listed in the “To:” field, while tweets are made available for interested 
individuals to pull on demand. The typical email has an articulated 
audience, while the typical tweet does not.” 
The statement demands nuancing, for we have seen that even minimal forms of 
activity such as “sharing” involve degrees of audience design – the seemingly 
vacuous identity statements we described above, lodged in social media 
practices, are always directed at some audience, of which users have some idea, 
right or wrong (cf. Androutsopoulos 2013). Imaginary audiences are powerful 
actors affecting discursive behaviour, as Goffman and others have shown so 
often (e.g. Goffman 1963), and Marwick and boyd’s early statement that “Twitter 
flattens multiple audiences into one” – a phenomenon they qualify as “context 
collapse” – is surely in need of qualification (Marwick & boyd 2010: 122). The 
intricate social-semiotic work we have described here certainly indicates users 
having diverse understandings of audiences on social media. Different social 
media platforms offer opportunities for different types of semiotic and identity 
work, and users often hold very precise and detailed views of what specific 
platforms offer them in the way of audience access, identity and communication 
opportunities and effects (cf. Gershon 2010). 
At the same time, Marwick and boyd are correct in directing our attention 
towards the kinds of communities in which people move on social media. In spite 
of precise ideas of specific target audiences and addressees, it is certainly true 
that there is no way in which absolute certainty about the identities (and 
numbers) of addressees can be ascertained on most social media platforms – 
something which Edward Snowden also made painfully clear. In addition, it is 
true that lump categories such as Facebook “friends” gather a range of – usually 
never explicitly defined – subcategories ranging from “real-life friends” and close 
relatives to what we may best call, following Goffman again, “acquaintances”. 
Goffman (1963), as we know, described acquaintances as that broad category of 
people within the network of US middle class citizens with whom relations of 
sociality and civility need to be maintained. Avoidance of overt neglect and 
rejection are narrowly connected to avoidance of intimacy and “transgressive” 
personal interaction: what needs to be maintained with such people is a 
relationship of conviviality – a level of social intercourse characterized by largely 
“phatic” and “polite” engagement in interaction. Acquaintances are not there to 
be “loved”, they are there to be “liked”. Facebook is made exactly for these kinds 
of social relationships (van Dijck 2013), which is perhaps also why a discourse 
analysis of Facebook interaction reveals the overwhelming dominance of the 
Gricean Maxims, that old ethnotheory of “polite” US bourgeois interaction (Varis 
forthcoming). 
But let us delve slightly deeper into this. The communities present as audiences 
on social media may be at once over-imagined and under-determined: while 
users can have relatively precise ideas of who it is they are addressing, a level of 
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indeterminacy is inevitable in reality. This means, in analysis, that we cannot 
treat such communities in the traditional sense of “speech community” as a 
group of people tied together by clear and generally shareable rules of the 
indexical value and function of signs (Agha 2007). Indexical orders need to be 
built, as a consequence, since they cannot readily be presupposed. Virality, as a 
sociolinguistic phenomenon, might be seen as moments at which such indexical 
orders – perceived shareability of meaningful signs – are taking shape. The two 
billion views of Gangnam Style suggest that large numbers of people in various 
places on earth recognized something in the video; what it is exactly they 
experienced as recognizable is hard to determine, and research on this topic – 
how virality might inform us on emergent forms of social and cultural 
normativity in new and unclear large globalized human collectives – is long 
overdue. 
 Some suggestions in this direction can be offered, though. In earlier work, we 
tried to describe “light” forms of community formation in the online-offline 
contemporary world as “focused but diverse” (Blommaert & Varis 2013). Brief 
moments of focusing on perceived recognizable and shareable features of social 
activity generate temporary groups – think of the thousands who “liked” 
Zuckerberg’s status update – while such groups do not require the kinds of 
strong and lasting bonds grounded in shared bodies of knowledge we associate 
with more traditionally conceived “communities” or “societies”. In fact, they are 
groups selected on demand, so to speak, by individual users in the ways we 
discussed earlier. People can focus and re-focus perpetually, and do so (which 
explains the speed of virality) without being tied into a community of fixed 
circumscription, given the absence of the deep and strong bonds that tie them 
together, and the absence of temporal and spatial copresence that characterizes 
online groups.  
A joint “phatic” focus on recognizable form or shape offers possibilities for such 
processes of groupness, while the actual functional appropriation and 
deployment of signs – what they actually mean for actual users – is hugely 
diverse; the infinite productivity of memes – the perpetual construction of 
memic “accents” – illustrates this. Here we begin to see something fundamental 
about communities in an online age: the joint focusing, even if “phatic”, is in itself 
not trivial, it creates a structural level of conviviality, i.e. a sharing at one level of 
meaningful interaction by means of a joint feature, which in superficial but real 
ways translates a number of individuals into a focused collective. Note, and we 
repeat, that what this collective shares is the sheer act of phatic communion (the 
“sharing” itself, so to speak), while the precise meaning of this practice for each 
individual member of the collective is impossible to determine. But since 
Malinowski and Goffman, we have learned not to underestimate the importance 
of unimportant social activities. Memes force us to think about levels of social 
structuring that we very often overlook because we consider them meaningless.  
This neglect of conviviality has effects. In the superdiversity that characterizes 
online-offline social worlds, we easily tend to focus on differences and downplay 
the level of social structuring that actually prevents these differences from 
turning into conflicts. Recognizing such hitherto neglected levels of social 
structuring might also serve as a corrective to rapid qualifications of the present 
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era as being “postsocial” – a point on which we disagree with Vincent Miller. 
There is a great deal of sociality going on on social media, but this sociality might 
require a new kind of sociological imagination. We will look in vain for 
communities and societies that resemble the ones proposed by Durkheim and 
Parsons. But that does not mean that such units are not present, and even less 
that they are not in need of description. 
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